58 STRIKE'S CASE.

Nicholas Strike; and, on the 21st of May, 1819, the bill was so
amended by consent, as to allow Samuel McDonald also to come
in as a plaintiff; and, that the claim should be made as due to
them as partners, under the firm of McDonald & Son.

It is stated in the bill, as thus amended, that the plaintiffs are
and have been some time past partners in trade, under the firm of
McDonald & Son; that, some time previous to the year 1811, a
partnership had been formed and carried on, between the defendant
Rogers and a certain Robert Henderson, under the firm of Hender-
son & Rogers, who as such contracted considerable debts; and,
among others, that the firm of Render son & Rogers became, and
are now indebted to the plaintiffs, as the firm of McDonald &
Son, to the amount of about six thousand dollars; that Henderson
& Rogers, becoming embarrassed in their affairs, Rogers, for the
purpose of preventing his private property from being made respon-
sible for the debts of the firm, on the 16th of January, 1811, by
two separate deeds of that date, assigned two lots of ground in
the city of Baltimore, which he held as chattels real, subject to a
ground rent, to the other defendant Nicholas Strike. These two
deeds are exhibited as parts of the bill; the one is expressed to be
in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars for one of the
lots; and, in the other, for the other lot, it is said to be in consider-
ation of the sum of nineteen hundred dollars. In other respects,
they are in the usual form of such instruments of assignment of
leasehold property.

It is further stated and averred in the bill, that the plaintiffs have
every reason to believe, that there was no bona fide sale of those
lots from Rogers to Strike; that no consideration passed between
them; that if Strike paid Rogers any money it was subsequently,
and by way of loan on the security of those deeds; and they were
understood by the parties to be expressly to avoid the payment of
the creditors of Rogers, or of Henderson & Rogers. And, as evi-
dence of this alleged fraud, the plaintiffs state, that a considerable
part of the money paid by Strike to Rogers, was expended by
Strike on one of the lots, after the execution of the deeds, and
charged to Rogers as a part of the purchase money; that another
portion of the pretended purchase money was expended by Rogers
in erecting a furnace, and other permanent buildings on the other
lot; that another part of the alleged purchase money was a sum
paid by Strike to Jacob Small, long after the execution of those
deeds, and even after the application of Rogers for the benefit of