522 IGLEHART v. ARMIGER.

Two of the bonds which had been taken from Armiger, after
several partial payments on them, were, on the 28th of December
1824, by James Iglehart, as trustee for the sale of the real estate of
John Cross deceased, assigned to John S. Selby one of the heirs of
the late Joseph Selby, and to whom a portion of his estate had been
awarded by the auditor's report, and the order thereon of the 1st
of April 1818. And, by Selby^ these bonds were assigned to
Robert S. Bryan; and, by him assigned to William McParlan.
Ntcholas J. Watkins and John S. Watkins undertook to guaranty
the payment of these bonds. Upon all which this bill was filed.

It was urged, that the equitable lien held by the court, arising
from the sale under its decree, or by the late Thomas Sellman, and
his successor, as trustee under the act of assembly, was assignable
in its nature; that it has been assigned; that it was necessarily
associated with the bonds given by the purchaser Armiger, and his
sureties, and virtually passed along with the assignment of them
from Iglehart to Selby, to Bryan and to McParlan.

An equitable lien is one of a very peculiar character. It is not
like the common law lien of factors, innkeepers and others, asso-
ciated with and entirely dependent upon the actual possession of
the property on which it is a tie; it is not like a general judicial
lien, which springs into existence in favour of a party who obtains
a ju4gment, which enables him to take the lands of the defendant
in execution, and continues as an incident to such unsatisfied judg-
ment to which the statute has expressly made all the lands of the
defendant liable; it is not like the lien of the State upon the pro-
perty of its debtor, founded as well on positive enactment as on
principles of common law, by which the interests of individuals
are postponed in favour of those of the public; it is not precisely
of the nature of the lien given by the civil law to those called
privileged creditors, such as nautical salvors, material men, &c.; nor
is it altogether like a common mortgage, although it operates and
is treated, in many respects, as a mortgage. It differs from all
these in this, that, if it exists at all, it must originate with, and as
an incident of the contract of purchase itself; that it is not always
a part, or principle of the contract as in the case of a lien given
by the civil law, to privileged creditors; that it is not founded on
any express stipulation; that it is not dependent on having pos-
session; that it is not deduced from any statute; and that it does
not rest on any general principles of common law.

This doctrine in relation to equitable liens, it is said, has been