HODGES v. MULLIKIN. 513

sure of the facts in relation to which, being called for by the bill,
ought to have been set forth by him in his answer. Before he filed
his answer, it was his duty to have read and maturely considered
the bill; and a very ordinary degree of care also required of him
an examination of the proceedings, in which he would have found
the answer of Harwood, in which the fact of the specified d^bts
being then outstanding was stated and relied on as a defence, at
least in preference to the claim of the plaintiff. Instead of which,
this defendant Mullikin, with a reckless negligence, which no court
of justice ought to tolerate, applied to the debtor, for whom he was
surety, and to the solicitor of the plaintiff, for information; and,
resting on what he thus learned, he filed an answer, carelessly
drawn by the solicitor of the plaintiff, without ever having made
the least inquiry in any other direction; although he had been thus
amply apprised of the necessity of doing so. If the interests of
this defendant alone were jeoparded; and, if no other person than
himself were likely to suffer by letting this decree stand, I certainly
could not open or modify it in any one single particular. He,
who has been so egregiously negligent of his own rights, can have
no claim to a rehearing, and a repetition of that litigation which
he has so carelessly suffered to be terminated to bis disadvantage.(q)
But, from the matters now disclosed, and for this purpose estab-
lished, it appears, that there are other views of this case, and other
consequences likely to arise from this decree as it now stands, than
those which relate exclusively to the defendant Mullikin, and the
injury which he alone may probably sustain. The creditors, or
cestui que trusts under the deed of the 7th of April 1810, are not
parties to this decree; and, therefore, their rights cannot be bound
by it; but nevertheless, if it is executed as it now stands, their
interests may be greatly embarrassed, materially injured, or perhaps
in some measure wholly sacrificed. If the real estate is sold under
it, the parties with whom they may have to deal will be varied and
multiplied; their case may be made more complex and difficult; and
a sale of the personal property will be attended with at least the same
consequences; and, in addition, it may be thereby removed entirely
beyond their reach. Besides, this decree upon the proceedings as
they now stand, would most grievously mislead a purchaser under it.
He would be warranted in concluding, that the property had been
discharged from the incumbrance of the deed of trust; because the

(q) Finley v. Bank U. S., 11 Wheat. 304.
65