HODGES v, MULLIKIN. 507

well established as a practice in Maryland,(c) is unknown to the
chancery practice of England. On an application for leave to file
a bill of review on the ground of newly discovered matter, I con-
sider it most correct and conformable to the course of this court, in
similar cases, that the propriety of granting the leave should be at
rmce fully investigated; that proofs should be admitted to be intro-
duced in relation to it; and that the question should be then finally
determined; since the evidence, should any be wanted by either
party, may be so fully and so readily collected by authorizing the
parties to take testimony before a justice of the peace, to be read
at the hearing of the application. But if no proof should be
asked for, then the application may be determined upon the
petition only as sworn to by the party applying. I am therefore
of opinion, that according to the principles and practice in chan-
cery of this State, the testimony in this case has been properly
taken; and therefore must now be attended to so far as it can be
considered as coming from competent witnesses.

It is objected that the defendant Thomas Harwood is an incom-
petent witness upon this occasion, because he is interested in hav-
ing this decree thrown entirely open by a bill of review. In all
cases, where there are two or more defendants, the court may, if
the liabilities of the defendants are distinct, or are susceptible of
being separated, pass a decree affecting each differently, or in
favour of one and against another of them. But if the case is so
blended and entire as to impose none other than a joint liability
upon all, so that the responsibility of no one can be separated from
the rest, then there must be a decree against all or none. And if
any one defendant, in such an entire case, makes out a good
defence, the bill must be dismissed as to all; and there can be no
decree against any other defendant, even if he should have admit-
ted the plaintiff's case, or the bill should have been taken pro con"
fesso as against him. This position I take to be sufficiently clear
and satisfactory upon the bare statement of it. But where the
decree does not charge two or more defendants and is entire in its
nature, it is not the course of the court to open or modify it further
than is indispensably necessary to correct the error complained of, (d)

Applying these principles to this case, it is clear, that this decree
need not, and therefore will not be opened in any manner for the

(c) Clapham v. Thompson, ante, 124, note.—(d) Lingan v. Henderson, ante, 235;
Ranelagh v. Thornhill, 2 Chan. Ca. 153.