MORETOM v. HARRISOM. 501

upon the simple contract a limitation of three years is a bar. But
although in the actions upon the bond and the simple contract
judgment may be rendered against him, upon the plea of limitation
applicable to each, that cannot, in any manner, affect his remedy
by ejectment or the bill to foreclose.(1)

It appears, that more than thirty-two years have elapsed since
the last payment before this suit was instituted. This great lapse
of time affords ample ground for the presumption of satisfaction
upon which the defendant relies; and if not explained or repelled
must be admitted to be a complete bar to the plaintiffs' claim.
Lapse of time operates as a bar, because of its raising a presump-
tion either, that the claim never existed, or if it had once existed,
that it has been satisfied. It cannot however be presumed,
that this claim never existed, because that is expressly admitted
by the defendant himself; consequently this lapse of time can only
be insisted on so far as it affords a presumption of satisfaction.
The defendant avails himself of it in like manner as he might have
done of positive proof of payment. He adduces and relies upon it
as evidence to sustain an allegation of payment, (m)

But the defendant does not frankly and directly declare, that he
had actually paid the whole amount of the purchase money. After
expressly admitting the contract, he then says, he does not admit,
that he has obtained all the credits he ought to have; he denies
that he admitted to any one, that any part of the purchase money
was due, or that he promised to pay it; and he does not admit,
that any part of the purchase money is due from him. All
this, according to the letter, may be true, and yet the defendant
may well know in his conscience, that he has not paid the whole
purchase money. If he knew he had actually paid it, why not
expressly say so, instead of saying he did not admit that any part
of it was due from him ? Perhaps, by a sort of mental reservation
he meant to say, he did not admit it was due, not because he
could, with a clear conscience, say he had, in reality, paid it; but,
being authorized to rely upon the presumption arising from the
lapse of time, he therefore did not admit it was due from him.
This is certainly a very stale claim; but its being so ought not
to be received as an apology for the slightest departure from that
frankness which the court always expects from a defendant when

(I) Toplis v. Baker, 2 Cox. 123.-— (m) Pow. Mort. S61, note, 1153,1155; Chal-
mer v. Bradley, 1 Jac. & Walk, 63; Christophers v. Sparke, 2 Jac & Walk. 233.