MORETON v. HARRISOF. 493

22d December, 1826.—BLAND, Chancellor.—These pleas have
been set down for hearing without a replication; consequently, the
sole object is to obtain the judgment of the court on their suffi-
ciency as they stand at this stage of the proceedings. The bill
charges, in substance, not only, that the defendant for a valuable
consideration became indebted to the intestates of the plaintiffs; but
it also goes on to allege, that the defendant afterwards paid a part of
the debt; and that although he, " well knows and has repeatedly
admitted the said sum of money and interest to be due, and has
promised at various times to pay the same," yet he has not done so.

It is perfectly well settled, that a partial payment is such an ac-
knowledgment of the existence of the debt as will take the case
out of the statute of limitations. But in this case, the partial
payment referred to was made on the 16th of October 1793, and
this suit was not instituted until the 29th of November 1825, a
lapse of more than thirty years. This, therefore, is clearly not such
an allegation, as if admitted to be true, would take the case out of
the statute of limitations. But the subsequent promises, charged
to have been made by the defendant, certainly would prevent the
statute from being applied as a bar if admitted to be true.

It is an established principle, that where any allegation of the
bill would avoid the bar created by the statute, such allegation
must be specially denied by an answer in support of the plea; for
otherwise, it will be taken as true, and the plea can then be no
bar; because it will appear upon the face of the proceedings to
have been sufficiently avoided. There is, in this case, no answer
denying the subsequent admissions and promises charged to have
been made; consequently, they must be taken for true, and are
an ample avoidance of the pleas; which, therefore, can be of no
avail whatever.

In the case of Morgan v. Roberts the defendant put in three
pleas. No objection was made on the ground, that a defendant
could not in equity, as well as at common law under the statute,
be allowed to plead two or more pleas in his defence; and I sus-
tained two of them, and overruled the third. Since then my
attention has been particularly called to this point. This matter
in England seems to be not yet finally settled.(a)

At common law, in almost all criminal cases, the accused is

(«) Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C. C. 417; 2 Ves. & Bea. 153, note; Gibson
v. Whitehead, 4 Mad. 241; Van Hook v. Whitlock, 3 Paige, 419; Beam. Pl. Eq. 14 ;
Mitf. Pl. 296; Wyat's Pra. Reg. 280.

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