ESTEP v. WATKINS

But these administrators rest their defence on the
there was " an understanding by him, (their intestate,) and
complainant, that the said suit, (in which the decree of the
22d of May 1815, was passed,) should not affect the interest
of their intestate in the aforesaid bond, and should only operate to
enable the complainant to obtain a conveyance for the land he had
purchased." In other words they admit, that the decree of the 22d
May 1815, as it stands, is a sufficient basis for the plaintiff's
equity; but they attempt to circumscribe its operation by setting
up a previous understanding or agreement of the parties to it, as
to what was intended to be its extent and effect. But no decree
can be thus collaterally affected or impeached. Every decree stands,
and must be allowed to stand, for what it purports to be on its face,
until it has been revised or reversed in a solemn and proper man-
ner, (o) Therefore, rejecting this ground of the defence, as being
utterly inadmissible, even supposing the fact of the alleged under-
standing to be true, there is nothing in the answers which is at all
at variance with the case presented by the bill.

It is certainly true as urged by the defendants' solicitor, that even
at the hearing, the plaintiff's case, as stated by himself, must be
shewn to have in substance, or in some essential bearing of it, such
a character as will confer jurisdiction on a court of chancery; it
must appear to be an equitable as contradistinguished from a mere
legal cause of action. The bill must itself shew why it was neces-
sary, or allowable for the plaintiff to leave the ordinary legal tribu-
nals and come into a court of chancery to seek relief. It seems to
have been formerly understood, that if it appeared upon the face
of the bill, that the plaintiff's remedy was properly at law,—as
where the bill was for the recovery of a debt due by bond,—if the
defendant answered and confessed the bond, he could not demur to
the relief; because, admitting the debt, he ought to pay it, and not
proceed to litigate it in either forum; or if the plaintiff was pro-
ceeding for the recovery of damages, the defendant might 'demur;
because the court could not settle the damages: but if he answered,
he could take no advantage of it at the hearing; for having sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the court, it would have the quantum
of damages adjusted in a feigned action at law.(c) The rale now
however is, that if the defendant could have demurred to the bill,

(b) 2 Mad. Cnan. 537; Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 204; (c) Glib. For. Resu
51, 53; North v. Strafford, 3 P. Will. 150; Pickering's case, 12 Mod. 171.

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