FORNSHILL v. MURRAY. 483

ling, for any cause, a contract of marriage which was originally
valid, ever having been conferred upon any of the courts of jus-
tice, it follows, that a divorce can only be granted by an act of
the General Assembly.(n) But all questions concerning alimony,
even under the provincial government, were considered as having
devolved upon the Court of Chancery. It was however provided,(o)
that the general court should have power, on an indictment or by
.petition of either party, to inquire into the validity of any mar-
riage, and might declare any marriage, contrary to the marriage
act, or any second marriage, the first subsisting, null and void.
This law, as it would seem, may now, since the abolition of the
general court, on proper application, be executed by a county
court. This court has been clothed with no such authority to
determine the validity of a contract of marriage; but, by virtue of
its general jurisdiction in matters of fraud affecting contracts, it
would seem, that, considering marriage as a mere civil contract, it
may, at the instance of either party, declare a marriage to be null
and void, which has been procured by abduction, terror and
fraud, (p)

In England, the validity of a marriage which is not absolutely
void but merely voidable, can only be drawn in question and deter-
mined, in a suit instituted for that purpose, in the ecclesiastical
court. But, as by the death of the husband, or the wife, the mar-
riage is at an end, so any then depending suit, which may have
been instituted during their lives for that purpose, is thereby im-
mediately abated, and cannot be, in any way, revived or further
prosecuted; nor can any other judicial proceeding be thereafter
instituted, in the ecclesiastical courts or elsewhere, for the purpose
of declaring a marriage, which has been thus terminated by the
death of either party, to have been null and void, for the purpose
of bastardizing the issue of such marriage, or barring the husband
of his courtesy, or the widow of her dower; nor can any one, by
any judicial proceeding be bastardized after his death, who had
carried the reputation of legitimate during his life; because wrongs,
and personal defects die with the individual; and the peace of
families and the nature of the testimony by which alone pedigrees
are capable of being traced, in cases where a party makes title by

(n) Utterson v. Tewsh, Fergusson's Rep. 23; Mrs. Levett's Case, Ferg. Rep.
appen, note G. 382.—(o) February 1777, ch. 12, s. 15.—(p) Portsmouth v. Ports-
mouth, 1 Hag. Rep. 355; In matter of Fust, 1 Cox. 418; Ex parte Turing, 1 Y«g.
& Bea. 140; Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopk. 478.