JONES v. JONES. 455

personal representatives of the late feme covert, not to those of her
deceased husband.(a)

A married woman, who is entitled to an undivided part of a real
estate, cannot be, in any way, deprived of it without her express
consent; which, by the common law, can only be obtained by a
fine, or, under the acts of assembly, by her privy examination
and acknowledgment of a deed conveying it to another. From
necessity, and for the purpose of effecting a partition of a real
estate, which is incapable of division without loss, it may be sold
and converted into personalty. But a change of the nature of
property, in order to attain a particular object, should not divest the
owner of his right to it, to any extent whatever. The conversion
of a real estate into personalty, for the purpose of .thereby awarding
to a feme covert, more fully and exactly than could otherwise be
done, her due share of it, ought not to be allowed to operate so as
to impair her right to it, or to lessen her absolute control over it in
any way whatever. When a married woman petitions for, or con-
sents to have a partition made of a real estate, in which she is
entitled to an undivided interest, and acquiesces in a sale of it, for
the purpose of making a just division of its value, because of its
being difficult, or impracticable to make a correct partition of it in
kind without mutual loss, she ought not to be considered as hav-
ing, thereby, virtually agreed to have her own absolute right to her
share transferred to another, or in any way lessened or impaired.
For if that were the effect of the judicial proceeding, then the in-
evitable consequences of a suit for a partition, in all such cases,
would be, that the suit itself would operate as a partial or total
extinguishment of the rights and interest of the feme covert.
Because, if, by a sale, for the purpose of effecting a partition,
the wife's share is thereby converted into personalty, which
her husband may, at pleasure and without her consent, reduce
into possession, the result will be, that she may thus be divested
of her real estate without her express consent; and even if
the husband were allowed so to take the wife's share as per-
sonalty, subject to what is called the wife's equity, then she
could only have a portion of it settled upon her; whereas the
whole of the proceeds of sale awarded to her are, in truth, bat
the substitute for her realty; and therefore, to do her justice, the

(a) Leadenham v. Nicholson, 1 H. & G. 275; Hammond v. Stier, 2 G. & J. 81;
Cary v. Taylor, 2 Vern. 302.