JONES v. JONES 4§|

where lands have been sold, under a fieri facias, they must be
considered as having been converted into personalty. So that if
the judgment should be afterwards reversed, the title of the pur-
chaser cannot be affected by it; for otherwise there would be no
security in purchasing at sheriff's sales.(t)

Hence the surplus of the proceeds of a sale of lands, as well as
of goods, remaining in the hands of the sheriff after a sale made
by him under a fieri facias, can only be viewed as the surplus of
that money which he was commanded by the writ to make and
bring into court. And hence such surplus must be regarded in all
respects as a portion of the personalty of the defendant.

From a case reported, as having been considered and determined
by the General Court, it appears that Philemon C. Blake had
given two bonds to the State for the performance of his official
duties as sheriff; on which the State sued, and having obtained
judgments on each of them, issued a fieri facias on the first judg-
ment, and had it levied upon his real estate, which was sold for a
sufficiency to satisfy the first judgment, leaving a surplus of ,£80,
which was then in the hands of the defendant. The only question
was, whether the State was entitled to a preference from the com-
mencement of the second suit, over any judgments obtained against
Blake, after that time. As to which it was held, that upon the
State's obtaining a judgment against its debtor, the act of assem-
bly (w) gave it a lien upon his lands by relation from the com-
mencement of the suit, into whosesoever hands they might come;
and therefore, that the State was entitled to have its second judg-
ment satisfied out of the surplus in preference to any judgment
rendered after the commencement of its second suit.(v)

The court is reported to have said, in delivering the reasons of
their judgment, that " the surplus of the money arising from the
sale of the said Blake's land, after satisfying the first judgment of
the State, remaining in the hands of the defendant, is to be consi-
dered as land, and subject to the attachment of the State, issued on
the second judgment, in preference to the claim of the plaintiff. "(w)

But the only question was, whether the lien of the State con-
tinued to adhere to the proceeds of the sale. Whether they were
to be considered as realty or personalty, was, therefore, a matter of
no kind of importance; and so it appears from the general teitor

(t) Davidson v. Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 616; Barney v, Patterson, 6 H. & J. 204
(ti) March 1778, ch. 0, s. 6.—(v) Davidson v. Clayland, 1 H. & J. 546.—(w) David-
son v. Clayland, 1 H. & J. 550.