*

JONES v. JONES 447

of suit against him, shall be liable to execution in whatever hands
or possession they may be found.(f) By which legislative enact-
ment the State's lien, as in England, relates not merely to the date
of the judgment, but to the commencement of the action. Whence
it follows, that the liability of the real estate of a debtor to the
State to be taken in execution, and the lien of the State incident
to such liability, are founded upon the common law and the acts of
assembly passed in express relation to debts due to the State.

But the general rule of the common law in regard to the liability
of real estate to be taken in execution as between party and party,
was modified by a statute passed in the year 1285, (g) which made
such estates liable to be partially taken in execution. This statute,
which gave the writ of elegit, enlarged the remedy of the creditor
by declaring, that, when a debt was recovered or damages adjudged,
it should be in the election of the plaintiff to have a fieri facias, or
to have all the debtor's chattels and the one half of his lands deliv-
ered to him until the debt was levied to a reasonable extent ;(h)
which gave the election immediately that the debt was recov-
ered; and therefore the whole land was held to be bound
from the day of the rendition of the judgment; and those con-
cerned, it was presumed, might easily ascertain from the record by
what judgments the lands of the debtor were thus bound.(i) But
as some inconvenience arose, because, according to the common
law, judgments took effect by relation from the first day of the
term, it was in the year 1676 declared by the statute of frauds,( j)
that the day on which judgments were rendered should be entered
upon the record; and that purchasers should be charged from such
time only, and not from the first day of the term whereof the judg-
ment was entered. This then was the nature and extent of the
judicial lien, as between party and party, with which the real estate
of a debtor might become bound in Maryland as well as in Eng-
land. And this judicial lien was afterwards mainly fortified and
enlarged by a statute passed in the year 1732,(k) applicable only to

the satisfaction of the debt, but that the State might also have, what is called, an
extent in aid, or a process to be levied upon debts due from others to the public debtor
to the fourth degree; thus taking in execution chosen in action, and bringing the debtors
of the State's debtor before the court to answer in a way similar to that of a garnished
under a foreign attachment Gilb. Exche. ch. 12. Petend. Abri. tit. Extent, B. The
act of Congress of the 20th of April, 1818, ch. 78, s. 8, gives a similar right, as against
corporations, to the United States. The United States v. Robertson, 5 Peters, 659

(/) March 1778, c. 9, s. 6; November 1787, c. 40.—(g) 13 Ed. 1, c. 18.—(h) 2 last
8IW.—(i) Glib. Exeeu. 37.—(j) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 14 & 15.—(k) 5 Geo. 2, c. 7.