436 WILLIAMSON v. WILSON.

like cases, placed the receiver in a similar situation. He is regarded
as a trustee in respect to the possession, care, and distribution of
the property committed to his charge; and as such it is his duty to
prevent the property, so handed over to his keeping, from being
Mended with his own, and to keep such clear and separate accounts
of his transactions as receiver as will enable him at all times and
immediately when called on to shew the amount of money and pro-
perty in his hands; and so distinctly to designate it, as that it may
be traced and followed into the hands of any one who may have
wrongfully obtained possession of it.(n) A receiver is always
jrequired to give bond to account and submit to orders; and if he
fails to account, or is, in any respect, delinquent as an officer of the
court,(o) he may be proceeded against in a summary way by
attachment; or his bond may be put in suit by scire facias in this
court, or an action at law so as to charge him and his sureties.(p)

But here the receiver died before he had fulfilled his trust, and
the question is, how far any of his rights, duties, and liabilities as
such have devolved upon his personal representatives ?

Where a sheriff has in his custody persons in execution and
dies, the new sheriff must take notice at his peril of all executions
against any person he finds in gaol; and that from necessity;
because there is no one to make delivery or give notice to the new
sheriff of the persons in custody when the former sheriff died.
And if a prisoner should in the mean time, go out of the walls of
the prison, it will not be deemed an escape as against either the
late sheriff or his successor; because the prisoner will be consid-
ered as in the custody of the law, and may be retaken any where
and at any time after. (q) A sheriff, having no property in pri-
soners detained by him in execution, leaves on his death no right,
duty or responsibility, as regards them, to devolve upon his per-
sonal representative. But, in personal property taken in execution
by him, he has in all cases a qualified interest, so far as to hold
possession, to sell and make the money, wherewith to satisfy the
plaintiff. And, for such purpose, he may hold and sell it even
after his official term has expired and he has ceased to be sheriff.(r)
From these principles it would seem necessarily to follow, where

(n) Freeman v. Fairlie, 8 Meriv. 41.—-(o) Anonymous, Mosely, 42.—(p) 2 Fow.
Excb. Prac. 828; Ex parte Grimstone, Amb. 707; Davies v. Cracraft, 14 Ves. 143;
Musgrave c. Medex 1 Meriv. 49; 2 Hair. Pra. Chan. 120; Grant v.. Stone, 1 Vern.
313—(q) Westby's Case, 3 Co. 72.—(r) Wilbaham v. Snow, 2 Saund. 47 notes.