426 WILLIAMSON v. WILSON.

vilege ceases; and equity requires, that he should make an equa.
distribution of his effects among them all. The giving of an undue
and improper preference, under such circumstances, is denounced
by the express provisions of our insolvent laws, as a fraud. And
in all cases, where a court of chancery can be called on, and
does interpose for the purpose of administering the assets of an
insolvent debtor, it is governed by the rule of equality; because
equality is equity. The assets, if insufficient to pay all, are
always distributed proportionably. But, although this is the duty
of an insolvent debtor; and is what a court of chancery will do for
him in all cases, where his effects can be subjected to its control;
yet if a creditor can fairly and legally obtain full payment from his
insolvent debtor, equity will not deprive him of his legal advantage
and compel him to refund.

These parties admit themselves to be insolvent debtors. The
plaintiff charges his copartners, the defendants, with a design to
waste the joint property, and to apply it to their own use. The
defendants deny these allegations, and charge the plaintiff with a
design to misapply the funds, and to give to some of the creditors
an undue preference. Taking the charges of the plaintiff and of
the defendants, or of either party to be true; or allow, that each or
either party was about to waste the property, or has his favourite
creditors to whom it is his design to give an undue preference;
and it is clear, that one or the other or both of them have formed a
fixed resolution to violate one of the great principles of equity,
which it is the peculiar province of this court to prevent. None
of the creditors of these insolvent debtors, so far as it appears,
have, as yet, obtained any legal advantage. It is proper therefore,
that this court should now lay its hands upon the joint property of
this partnership, and let all its creditors come in pari passu, and
according as their respective priorities, if any, should appear. Both
parties profess to have had this equitable distribution in contem-
plation; both acknowledge themselves to be in that insolvent con-
dition, in which the making of such an equitable distribution has
devolved upon them as a duty. And yet each charges the other
with having made an effort, and formed a fixed design to disregard
this duty. Neither of them seems to have the least confidence in
the other. Under all these circumstances, I consider this as a
case, in which it is peculiarly fit and proper, that a receiver should
have been appointed before answer, and should now be continued,