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WILLIAMSON P. WILSON.
the abuse of this power; and to what extent, by its means, could
he injure his antagonist? The appointment of a receiver does
not, of itself, divest any one of possession; it merely authorizes
the receiver to demand, and to accept the possession when volun-
tarily delivered, or to take it when held by no one else. For, if
the holder of the property refuses to deliver it, the receiver or party
interested must apply to the court for an order to deliver posses-
sion, or to shew cause to the contrary. In all cases, where the
order making the appointment has been made ex parte, and before
answer, the defendant is allowed to come in at an early day and
move to have the order rescinded. And, as regards third persons,
who may have an interest in property thus ordered to be taken
possession of by a receiver, they too are allowed, in a summary
way on notice of motion, to come in and be examined pro interesse
suo.(h)
Upon the whole, from whatever point of view this chancery
power may be contemplated; or in relation to whatever of the
various emergencies, to which it has been applied, it may be con-
sidered, it will be found in all respects as safe, and as little liable
to abuse as any judicial procedure known to the common law. It
will be found in practice, that little or no useless pressure can be
produced in any case; and that, in no instance, can the mischief
continue long before the party aggrieved may have an opportunity
of being fully heard, and of obtaining complete relief.
This bill has been filed by one partner against his copartners,
charging them with a design to consume and waste the joint pro-
perty, or to apply it to their own use : and it avers, that the firm is
absolutely insolvent. The answer denies these charges of the bill,
but admits the insolvency of the firm; and then charges the plain-
tiff with a design so to apply the joint funds as to give an undue
and improper preference to one or more of their creditors. These
parties have, in many respects, given an opposite and very differ-
ent account of the state of affairs between them. They both,
however, admit the present insolvency of the firm; and agree,
that according to the stipulations of their contract of copartnership,
the term of its duration has not yet expired.
It seems to be admitted, where a specified period of time is
limited for the continuance of a partnership, that neither party can,
at his option alone, dissolve the connexion. But, although such
(h) 2 Mad. Chan. 245.
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