MACKUBIN v. BROWN. 415

for hearing, and the solicitors of the parties having been heard, the
proceedings were read and considered.

Any further sale of the real estate of the late Basil Brown to
satisfy the claims of Marriott, Shipley, and Vansant, is opposed by
Stockett and wife on several grounds.

First, they rely upon the lapse of time as affording? a presump-
tion, that those claims were either satisfied or abandoned. But the
fact, that these claimants were infants, and have but lately attained
their full age, furnishes a satisfactory answer to this objection.

Secondly, they allege, that the personal estate of the late Basil
Brown, in the hands of his administrators was amply sufficient to
satisfy these claims and ought to have been so applied; and that
these claimants cannot be allowed to proceed against his real
estate until the personalty has been exhausted. This objection, if
it had been sustained by the fact, would have been conclusive
against the passing of the decree for the sale of his real estate.
But, it is now entirely too late to make such an objection, after a
decree expressly grounded upon an admitted or established allega-
tion of the insufficiency of the personal estate to pay all the debts
of the deceased. After such a decree no creditor, who may in all
other respects be entitled to come in, can be turned away from
proceeding against the real estate to seek payment out of the per-
sonal estate of his deceased debtor.

A third objection is, that these claimants should not be permitted
to come in as creditors against the estate of the late Basil Brown ;
because, although he sold, he did not receive payment for the whole
of the estate of the late William Hammond; and these claimants
can only be considered as creditors of Basil Brown upon the
ground, that he received those proceeds, a portion of which had
been allotted to each of them. And it is also alleged, that a part
of those proceeds were collected by Matthias Hammond, one of
the administrators of Brown, after his death.

It has been the practice of the court to allow a trustee to make
the sale in a manner, and upon terms different from those specified
in the decree, where the interests of the parties appear to be in no
way injured by doing so. And those concerned being always noti-
fied to shew cause, if any they have, why the sale should not be
ratified, it has been found, that much good and no material injury
has arisen by sanctioning deviations to this extent by trustees.
The trustee is always directed by a decree, authorizing a sale upon
credit, to bring into court the bonds or notes taken by him to secure