390 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.

But a man in his dotage is evidently distinguishable from an
idiot, who has no mind at all; a patient in delirium, whose mind
is ungoverned and ungovernable; or a lunatic, whose mind is in
ruins, broken up, and the component parts of which are at variance
with each other. The old man has a mind, worn and in a state
of decay, it is true, but still, so much of it as remains, is feebly
governed upon the principles of its former sound condition; its
conceptions are not impertinently mixed; nor is it grossly mis-
guided in any of the feeble operations of which it is capable.
Perhaps the most striking peculiarity of dotage is its imbecility of
perception. The senses not supplying the mind as usual with
matter for exertion, it decays for want of use; and becomes inca-
pable of receiving any additional ideas, or of following through
any unusually catinated, or long combination of thought. Hence
the infant and the dotard, from imbecility of bodily functions,
present that remarkable similarity in the feebleness of their minds ;
and easily surrender themselves to the direction of those about
them, for whom they have a regard, or who may choose to exercise
any authority, or influence over them. Physicians, it appears, do
not regard this species of mental imbecility as being in itself a
disorder, or the effect of disease.(o) But the law considers it
not only as a species of insanity, from which there is no hope
of recovery, but as one which always becomes worse as age
advances, (p)

It has been long and well established, that a contract made by a
person who is, at the time, actually non compos mentis, either as in
idiocy, delirium, lunacy, or dotage, is entirely void; indeed it would
seem to be difficult to conceive how such a contract should ever have
been otherwise considered than as an absolute nullity.(o;) But the
law does not allow of an examination into the wisdom and prudence
of men in disposing of their estates; for every man who is legally
compos mentis, is a disposer of his property, and his will stands for
a reason. The law however so far regards human infirmity, as that
if a person of weak mind be imposed upon, he may be relieved; not,
however, merely because of his weakness of mind, or of his old
age; for, that alone furnishes no sufficient ground for vacating a

(o) Rees' Cyclo. ver. Death; 1 Par. & Fonb. 308; Rush on the Mind, 61, 292, 294;
Conolly Ind. Insanity, ch. 8 & page 440, 443.—(p} Leving v. Caverly, Prec. Chau.
229; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 66; Ex porte Cranmer, 12 Ves. 446; Gibson v.
Jeyes, 6 Ves. 275.—(g) Thompson v. Leach, 1 Ld. Raymond, 313; 3 Mod. 301.