DORSEY v. CAMPBELL. 303

by a good and sufficient deed to be executed and acknowledged
according to law, convey to the said complainant Clernent Dorsey,
in fee simple, the two parcels of land called St. Clair and Recom-
pense, lying and being in Charles county, and sold and conveyed
by Henry Anderson to the said Campbell & Ritchie, and subse-
quently sold to the said Clement Dorsey by the said Campbell &
Ritchie. The said conveyance to* be made on the payment or
bringing in of the sum of $822 78 with interest from the 1st of
December, 1822, as aforesaid.

Upon this decree a fieri facias was issued on the 16th of
November 1826, in favour of the defendants for the sum decreed
to them against the plaintiff, which was levied on the lands speci-
fied in the decree; and they were sold and purchased by the soli-
citor of the defendants for their use for the sum of $710. After
which on the 19th of January, 1828, the defendants filed their
petition, stating these circumstances, and thereupon prayed, that
the possession of the lands might Be delivered to them. *

21st January) 1828.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The petition of the
defendants having been submitted without argument, the proceed-
ings were read and considered.

It appears that the fieri facias, by virtue of which the land was
sold, was returnable to March term 1827; but was not actually
returned until the first day of. September term of that year; and
this application to have the possession delivered has not been
made until after the end of the term then next following, or
December term, which closed on the 15th of the present month.

The authority of this court to cause the possession of land, sold
under its decree, to be delivered to the purchaser thereof, under
certain circumstances, cannot be controverted; and the mode of
proceeding in such cases has been well established.(c) But this,

(c) Dove v. Dove, Dick. 617; Same Case, 1 Bro. C. C. 375; Stribley t?. Hawkie,
3 Atk. 275; The Commonwealth v Ragsdale, 2 Hen. & Mun. 8.

McKoMB v. KANKEY.—20th March, 1807.—-KILTY, Chancellor.—The general
power of the Court of Chancery to issue an injunction, directing possession to be
delivered, is sanctioned by the practice in England and by our acts of assembly.
The decree for possession and injunction is a process demandable of right as much
as an attachment or other execution, and ought not to be refused where the power is
considered to exist. An application for possession in such cases is founded on the
general powers of the court, and on the act of 1785, ch. 72, s. 25, which provides
that the Chancellor may cause by injunction the possession of the estate and effects
demanded by the bill and petition, and whereof the possession or a sale is decreed to
be delivered to the plaintiff or otherwise, according to the terms and import of such