350 CHASE v. MANHARDT.

have any just cause of complaint. Admitting every thing that has
been said upon this subject to be true, it amounts to no more than
this:—that Kyd and Bryden were disposed, if possible, to prevent
Manhardt from having Chase's debt applied in satisfaction of his
claim, on the ground, that it was not liable to be so applied, or
that Kyd had obtained a prior assignment or lien upon it, and that
Manhardt compromised matters with them in order to enable him,
without further delay, to obtain some satisfaction by means of the
attachment laid in the hands of Chase. It is true, that equity will
in some cases relieve a party from the consequences of a fraud,
which has been practised upon a third person. As, if the fraud
practised upon Manhardt alone had by any consequence or recoil
injuriously rested upon the interests of Chase, he might have asked
and obtained relief from this court, (v) But in this case, the squib
aimed at Manhardt did not reach, or at all affect Chase; he,
therefore, can hav«* no cause of complaint whatever upon that
ground,

In fine I am perfectly satisfied, that Manhardt's judgment against
Bryden cannot now be impeached in any way; that in obtaining
the verdict in the attachment case, Chase was not taken by surprise;
and, that there has been no fraud practised upon him. But that
there was a mistake in the judgment of condemnation obtained
against him is absolutely certain. Indeed it is admitted, that to
some extent a mistake had been made, which it was agreed should
be corrected. The nature and extent of that mistake is now
perfectly ascertained in the manner and upon the principles I have
explained. Chase was accidentally and erroneously represented as
being indebted to Bryden to»the full amount of Manhardt's judg-
ment against Bryden, when in truth the fact was not so. This
mistake must, therefore, be now corrected as was agreed. The
staying of proceedings at law, upon the ground that judgment had
been by mistake obtained for more than was really due, is quite
a common case,—one which is often presented to this court.
In such cases the verdict is never disturbed; or a new trial
ordered.

Charging C4ase with interest from the 17th of January, 1813,
when the debt became due, to the 13th of October, 1817, when
the judgment of condemnation was rendered, it appears that the

(v) Clifford v. Brooke, 13 Ves. 132; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 156 Garretson
*. Cole, 1H. & J. 374.