340 CHASE v. MANHARDT.

tially dispensed with, or altogether waived so as to ,make Chase
the debtor of Bryden; and when ?

From all the pleadings and proofs it is clear, that the complain-
ant acquiesced in the fact, and acted upon the conviction of his
having become legally and properly the debtor of Bryden in the
sum of $6000 from the 17th of July 1812, when the papers were
tendered to him. He was right in refusing to give his notes at
that time, because of the attachment. It was not, however, the
giving of his notes, which alone could fix him as the debtor of
Bryden; but the delivery of the papers, or his dispensation
with that delivery, either as a condition precedent or altogether.
Chase did not reject the performance proffered to him by Bryden ;
because it was partial, or at all defective in its nature. On the
contrary, he expressly said he had no objections to make to it;
and rested his non-compliance, on the pendency of the attach-
ment; and nothing more. From the position he then assumed,
it manifestly appears, that he waived the delivery of the papers
as a condition precedent; and relied upon his contract jalone,
considering it as an independent agreement, by means of which
he might obtain them. He might then have taken the ground,
that the delivery was a condition precedent; or he might have
offered to deposit the money in court on those papers being
delivered to him; or he might have put that defence upon
the record in the attachment case by a special plea, or in
answer to the interrogatories propounded to him. But he
did not do so. He must, therefore, be considered as the debtor
of Bryden on the 17th of July, 1812, according to the terms
of his contract.

Being perfectly satisfied of these facts, and that Samuel Chase
did thus acknowledge and consider himself as the debtor of Bry-
den on that day; it is unnecessary to determine whether this claim
of Bryden's was or was not such a debt as might have been
attached in the hands of Chase as his garnishee; since Chase's
whole course of conduct in the attachment case amounts to a total
and absolute waiver of every objection on that ground, (b)

The laext question therefore is, whether, according to the nature
of the contract between Bryden and Chase he was chargeable with
interest, and from what time? It has been insisted, that Chase
ought to be charged with interest from the date of his contract, and

(b) Louderman v. Wilson, 2 H, & J. 379.