CUNNINGHAM v. BROWNING.

warrant called for five hundred acres " adjoining the west line of
Gore," it was held, that the description "was sufficient to

of any case in which it has prevailed. There is apparently still less force in the
objection arising from the situation of the chain-carrier, as proved by the deposition
of Samuel Hawkins, and also in the trifling errors in the phraseology of the warrant,
which were mentioned in the argument. It would seem, therefore, that the point
most relied on by the caveator, is the want of. precision in the location, or as he
expresses it, the location being too broad.

It is certainly the interest of every person who takes out a special warrant, to
describe or locate the land as clearly and precisely as he can, in order to bind and
secure it from the operation of other warrants; but there is no set form, or expres-
sion required in order to comply with the general rule, which (as laid down by the
late Chancellor in 1793,) was, that the description of the warrant Ihould suit none
but the land contended for, and that it should be so full and certain as plainly to point
out the intention. There is, however, some reason to doubt whether the rule was
not less strict before the revolution, for it appears that the special warrants in the
years 1773 and 1774, seldom went further than to state the vacancy to be adjoining
to some particular tract or tracts, either naming them or the persons in possession of
them.

In the case of Pumphrey v. Wallace, the reasons for allowing the caveat of the
latter are not expressed, and can only be inferred from what appears on the papers;
because it would be totally improper to take the opinion of C. Wallace, as expressed
in his deposition, or that of any other person, as evidence of such reasons. Pumphrey *s
warrant was dated the 28th of December, 1792, and executed on the 6th of February
1708. But Wallace had taken out a warrant of resurvey on the 18th of January,
1798; so that the question must have been how far the location made in Pumphrey's
warrant was binding, so as to prevent the operation of the warrant of Wallace, which
bound all the contiguous vacancy, supposing it not previously secured. The vacancy
in dispute consisted of cultivated land, as appears by the receipt of the treasurer for
improvements; and it may be inferred, that the caveat was ruled good on the ground
of the location in Pumphrey's warrant being vague and indefinite, as was decided in
the case of Beatty v. Orendorf, in 1793, (Land Ho. Ass. 400,) in which the vacancy
was also cultivated land, and the claim of Orendorf on a warrant of resurvey.

It is not, however, necessary in the present cases, to determine whether the location
or description in the warrant, was sufficient to bind or secure the vacancy aimed at,
or to say what would be the result of the facts established by the depositions and the
surveys returned, because the several parcels of land returned in Goodwin's certifi-
cates do not appear to have been cultivated, or to have had improvements thereon;
and therefore must be taken as uncultivated, and liable to be affected by a common
warrant, and it will be observed, that two of the certificates returned by the caveator
on his warrant, supposed to include the same land, are for uncultivated land, and the
improvements on the other three are only a few fence logs.

It was stated in the argument, that the warrant was not a proper one—that it was
neither a special nor a common warrant. But, although it was not simply a common
warrant, yet it might be used as such, and the general tenor of special warrants was,
and still is, to direct the surveyor to lay out the said quantity, be the same culti-
vated or otherwise. On this subject the following points appear to have been settled:—
That a special warrant shall be allowed to do every tiling which a common warrant
might do;—that a special warrant may abandon its first intention, and may be used
to affect my lands which may be affected by a common warrant, however distant
they may be from the land described in the special warrant; and that, in such case.