328 CUNNINGHAM v. BROWNING.

by his style of judge of the Land Office, The rules of decision by
which the Chancellor is governed in the exercise of his jurisdiction,
in all such cases, are to be found in the established law of the Land
Office, or, in the absence of any such positive law, the rule of
decision may be drawn from the principles of equity as established
in the High Court of Chancery. The whole law of the Land Office
is thus made up of certain positive regulations, of usages, and of
common law and equitable principles respecting imperfect legal
titles; or those contracts for land between the State and her citizens
which are found in an immature and unfinished condition.

It is a well settled general rule, that under a special warrant the
title to the land commences from the date of the warrant itself;
because the description of its location, embodied in the warrant,
, has distinguished it from every other tract. The warrant is, there-
fore, in itself equivalent to a designation by an actual survey.
So too the title commences with the date of a warrant of resurvey,
and of an escheat, or a proclamation warrant. But upon a common
warrant, it only commences with the date of the certificate of
survey; or from the date of the entry of a special location upon
the surveyor's book. The land aimed at becomes thus bound,
because of its having been, by some of these modes, accurately
described and distinctly specified. The reason of the rule is the
same in all these cases, and the evils to be avoided alike in all.

The citizen is allowed one year, from the time he designates
the land he proposes to obtain, to complete his purchase,
and perfect his title according to the prescribed rules. During
which time the State stands pledged to sell that land to no one
else. But the State might be greatly retarded, embarrassed and
defrauded in making sale of its lands, if they could be tied up,
and held bound by any loose, shifting, or indefinite description
of them. And the allowing of lands to be bound by vague
descriptions, would be no less grievous in its consequences to
individuals. No purchaser could be sure of his purchase. He
might be jostled out of his location by one who had given no
previous distinct intimation of its being that place or tract which
he had in view. The records would furnish no sure guide; and
the chief distinction between a common and a special warrant
would be frittered down to nothing, or continued only as a delusive
name.(v)

(v) Report of D. Dulany, 1 H. & McH, 553; Land Ho. Ass. 401.