CUNNINGHAM v. BROWNING.

From all which it appears, that the mode of obtaining a grant
of public lands, and proceedings by caveat, on the common law

really doubtful, whether, under all circumstances, the appeal should be said to be
dismissed, or the decision of the judge be said to be affirmed. The meaning of the
Chancellor is, that nothing be gained by the appeal, and that hereafter it be no
obstacle to the said Wright's obtaining a patent.

The said act of assembly does not direct, what Fhall be done in case of an affirm-
ance on an appeal. But the Chancellor conceives, that he may with propriety direct,
and accordingly he does hereby direct, that the transcript aforesaid be returned, along
with an attested copy of this adjudication, order or decree, to the register of the
land office of the Eastern Shore; and that, on the receipt of the said transcript, there
shall be the same proceedings in the said .office, on the certificate of resurvey of
Sovran Wright, which was caveated by Evans Willing, as if there had been no appeal
as aforesaid. _____

HOPPER v. COLESTON.—2d March, 1803.—HANSON, Chancellor.—The said Wil-
liam Hopper appeals from the decision of the judge of the land office for the Eastern
Shore, on a caveat there instituted by him against the appellee, or defendant. The
transcript of the proceedings in the said office on the said caveat, except the plat
there exhibited for illustration, are here filed by the said appellee; and it was, at his
instance, that this day was appointed for hearing the appeal, by an order, passed on
the 1st day of December last. It appears, that a copy of the said order has been
duly served on the appellant, from whom the Chancellor lately received a letter,
praying a postponement of the hearing. The defendant, James Coleston, now appears
here, in person, and prays the Chancellor to proceed to a decision.

As Mr. Hopper's application for a postponement is principally grounded on the
idem, that the Chancellor may direct new evidence to be taken, before he decides, in
the same manner, as if he were about to exercise an original jurisdiction, this
ground must certainly fail. An appellate jurisdiction has to decide merely whether
or not the inferior jurisdiction gave a just decision on the case before it. Were the
appellate jurisdiction to admit new proofs, it would decide on a case, different from
that which was before the lower tribunal; and therefore, it would not appear, from
its decision, whether the first decision was right or wrong.

The Chancellor proceeded to examine the transcript, with a view of being informed
of the nature of the case. Mr. Hopper had, in his letter, stated, that indisposition
would prevent his attendance on this day. It was the Chancellor's intention, if the
case should appear difficult, or if the transcript should be materially defective, to
postpone the decision.

It is certain, that the plat, for illustration, ought to have been part of the proceed-
ings, transmitted to this office; but the full perspicuous statement, made by the judge
enables the Chancellor to understand the case, as fully without, as with the plat;
and there seems to be not the least difficulty in the case, every point therein having
long since been settled in this office.

A question indeed might be made, whether or not an appellate court can give
relief to an appellee; that is to say, whether or not the said court ought not to con-
fine itself to the question, whether or not the appellant is entitled to relief. But the
High Court of Appeals, in the case of Scott against Chapline, gave relief to Scott,
who w«s satisfied, and did not appeal, against Chapline who was dissatisfied, and
therefore did appeal. But setting this precedent aside, the Chancellor conceives it
his duty to rectify mistakes in whatever way he may be apprized of them; and par.
ticularly to have the rules here established to prevail on the Eastern Shore.