316 CUNNINGHAM v, BROWNING,

twelve months, unless under special circumstances. A caveat by
two or more does not abate by the death of one of them, as it does
where it has been entered by one only.(g)

The grounds upon which a caveat may be entered are various;
in general they must be such as shew, that no grant ought to be
issued; because to do so would be unjust to the public, or to some
individual ;(h) or because the applicant had, in some way, failed

(f) Land Ho. Ass. 283, 442, 443, 490; 1797, eh. 114, s. 10.

(A) Land Ho. Ass. 90, 91, 304, 449, 453, 491.

RIDGELY v. JOHNSON.—24th November, 1801.—HANSON, Chancellor.—The Chan-
cellor having examined all the depositions in this cause, produced to support the
allegations of the parties, together with the plot returned for illustration; and having
considered also the arguments of the counsel on each side, and having deliberated
thereon, is of opinion as follows:—

He must first make some preliminary remarks.—When a man caveats a certificate,
on the ground that the land, surveyed as vacancy, is comprehended in his patent;
unless tile Chancellor is thoroughly satisfied, that the fact is so, it is the invariable
practice to dismiss the caveat, suffer a patent to be issued on the certificate, and leave
the parties to contend at law, before a court and jury. And for this plain reason,
that a dismission puts an end to the pretensions on one side, but leaves the other
party, viz. the caveator, in a condition so to contend. Besides, the State is interested.
If the caveat be allowed, it may be, that the State thereby loses the benefit of granting
vacant land.

But independently of the claim or pretensions of a caveator, or caveators, it is clear
that, if in any case it appears, that the land comprehended in a survey is not properly
gran table, no patent ought to issue for the same. That this position is just, appears
from the decree of Chancellor Rogers, who in the year 1786, vacated a patent, on the
ground that the land ft€rein contained was not grantable. For surely, if a patent be
repealed, or vacated on that ground, it must be supposed, that a patent would not
have issued, if the ground had been known, before the patent was granted.

That the law respecting accretion, alluvion, and islands, in small waters or rivers,
is part of the law of Maryland, as well as of the law of England, and indeed as of
the law of nature, the Chancellor, on reflection, entertains not a doubt; and in his
conception, it is of no consequence, whether the persons, having lands on such
waters, acquired their title before, or after the islands, opposite to their lands, were
formed. They had, at any rate, a common right to the river; and, of course, either
one, or all of them, has a right to the benefit of an island formed in the river. And
even, if they have not an exclusive right to the benefit of such islands, it seems, at
least, that all those, having lands in the river, or the inhabitants in general of the
State, must have that right. In this State, it may be said, that a man can claim
nothing, except what is contained, or described in his patent. But the right of
following tile water, or having the benefit of accretion, has been admitted; and
mighty inconvenience would result if it were not so settled. And the common right
of those having land on small waters to the little islands, which are formed after their
titles acquired, seems at least as reasonable, as the right of accretion. But the
principle of the ease decided by Mr. Rogers applies to the present case. In short,
it appears to the Chancellor, that a patent cannot possibly, with propriety, issue to
the defendant in this cause; although what person, or persons, or whether any person
may be exclusively-entitled to the flat, island, or marsh, surveyed* by the defendant,
ma? hereafter be a subject of litigation.