OGDEN v. OGDEN.

But if it be reasonably doubtful, whether what passed was only a
treaty, let the progress towards the confines of an agreement be
more or less, or if it be doubtful, whether the language used was
intended as expressive of an agreement, the court will not decree
the specific performance of that which appears doubtful as a
contract, (i)

But this letter is deficient in almost every substantial particular.
It is not a promise in any sense. The writer speaks of circum-
stances which have occurred; of a marriage then contemplated; of
what he intended to do; and of the manner in which he meant to
dispose of his property. But there is not the least intimation that
he had brought about the* courtship, or had encouraged John W.
Ogden to marry his niece by any promise of a fortune with her.
He does not undertake, agree, or oblige himself to give any thing.
He tells his brother what he means to do, should the marriage take
place; but he binds himself to nothing; every thing is reserved
entirely within his own power, (j) The plaintiffs had resolved
to many before this letter was written; therefore, even supposing
it had been shewn to John W. Ogden, it could not have been
the inducement upon which he addressed and became engaged
to marry Nancy Ogden. Whatever were his hopes and expecta-
tions, they existed prior to, and independently of this letter; they
could not have arisen in any respect from it.(k) There is no
proof, that the late Amos Ogden had induced the plaintiffs to enter-
tain any hopes or expectations of his bestowing any thing upon
them in consideration of their marriage. After they had become
engaged, he then expressed his entire approbation, and he then
formed his liberal determination; but there is no proof that he
himself communicated it to them prior to their engagement. And
in his letter to his brother, there is nothing which gives to that
determination the character of a contract.

Being perfectly satisfied upon these grounds, that the plaintiffs
have not established such a case as to entitle them to any relief
whatever, I deem it wholly unnecessary to say any thing in rela-
tion to the doctrine of satisfaction and election; or how far the
devise to John W. Ogden and his wife, and their having actually
elected to take under the will, is to be considered as a satisfac-
tion and election in bar of their claim; since it is my opinion

(t) Huddleston v. Briscoe, 11 Ves. 583; Stratford v. Bosworth, 2 Ves. & B. 341;
Alien v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 173.—(j) Randall v, Morgan, 12 Ves. 67; Morison v
Turnour, 18 Ves. 175.—(k) Ayliffe v. Tracy, 2 P. Will. 65.

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