OGDEN v. OGDEN.

her a marriage portion; to bestow upon her some of his property,
or to provide for her in some way or other; and some of the proofs
describe a contract essentially different from that deduced from the
letter. But the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to use the letter as
evidence of a contract in connexion with a part only of the verbal
testimony, rejecting the rest. The whole must be taken together;
and then the verbal proof, instead of sustaining, materially differs
from and falsifies the terms of that contract, which it is contended
is shewn by the letter.(a)

The bill rests the plaintiff's pretensions upon the ground, that
the late Amos Ogden induced John W. Ogden to marry Nancy by
a promise, that he would give her twelve thousand dollars as a
marriage portion; and refers to the letter of the 22d of May, and
certain other circumstances, as evidence of that promise. The
defendant Amos Ogden admits, that the copy exhibited is in the
handwriting of the late Amos Ogden; but all the defendants posi-
tively deny having any knowledge whatever of any such promise
or inducement to the marriage as is charged in the bill. None of
the defendants have, in their answers, relied upon the statute of
frauds; but it has been mainly insisted upon by them, in argument,
at the hearing.

The statute of frauds, so far as it is applicable to this case, is
expressed in these words :—" No action shall be brought whereby
to charge any person, upon any agreement made upon consideration
of marriage, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."(6)

This clause was at one time supposed to embrace mutual pro-
mises to marry, but that notion has long since been abandoned,
and it is now held to extend only to agreements to pay marriage
portions, or to such cases as the one now under consideration.(c)
The word " agreement," it has been settled, must not be loosely
construed, but be taken in its proper and correct sense, as signify-
ing a mutual contract on consideration between two or more
parties; the whole of which, the consideration as well as the
promise, must be in writing.(d)

(a) Cooper v. Smith, 15 East, 103.—(6) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4.—(c) Harrison v, Ctg®,
1 Ld. Raym. 387.—(d) Wain v. Warfters, 5 East, 10; Stadt v. Lill, 9 East, 848;
Raadafl v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 74.