LINGAN v. HENDERSON.

From their nature, pleadings in equity do not in general admit
of the same precision as pleadings at law; but in equity, as well
as at law, the pleadings must be substantially sufficient. The
plaintiff is not tied down to any particular form of stating his case
in his bill; for, however loosely or awkwardly its statements may
be made, yet he may obtain the relief he seeks, if, upon a fair read-
ing of the whole, it appears, that a sound case has been substan*
tially set forth. But if a defendant in equity puts in a plea, consi-
derable precision is required; because he thereby proposes to reduce
his case to a single point, (r) And therefore, as to pleas in equity,
there does not appear to be any material difference between the rules
of a court of common law, and those of a court of chancery. Where
the case, as stated in the bill, appears to involve several distinct sub-
jects as component parts of one complex whole, and the defendant
offers a plea in bar, it must be so framed as to be exactly applicable
to the case; for if it be impossible to know to which of the several
subjects spoken of in the bill it precisely refers, it will be deemed bad
in form as well as in substance, (s) So too a plea in equity, as well
as at law, must tender a material issue; it must not only reduce the
defence to a single point, but that point must be of such a nature
as, when determined, will enable the court to put an end to the
case.(t) In equity, as at law, a plea of the statute of limitations
must be properly applicable to the particular nature of the case;
as where a note was given for the payment of an annuity during
the life of the annuitant, the defendant pleading, that he did not
promise to pay within six years is bad; he should have pleaded the
cause of action hath not accrued within the six years.(u) And so,
in an action of trespass, the statutory limitation to which is four
years, where the defendant, instead of relying upon that lapse of
time as a bar, pleaded not guilty within six years; the plea upon
demurrer was held bad; because it did not precisely disclose, and
rely upon that which had been made a bar by the statute.(^)
Whence it appears to be necessary, that the plea of this defend-
ant .Richard Henderson, should be found to have reduced the
defence to a single material point, the determination of which will
enable the court at once to put an end to the case.

(r) Carew v. Johnston, 2 Scho. & Lefr. S05; Rowe v. Teed, 15 Tea. 377.—(s) Meder
9. B«rt» Gab. Eq. Rep. 185; Talbot v. May, 3 Atk 18.—(I) Jones v. Davis, 16 Ves.
164; Morrison v. Tumour, 18 Ves. 181; Steff v. Andrews, 2 Mad. Rep. 5; Co. Litt.
126.—(ii) 8 Atk. 70; Gould v. Johnson, 2 Salk. 422.—(v) Blackmore v. Tidder-
tey, 2 Ld. Raym. 1099; Macfadzen v. Olevant, 6 East, 339.