f72 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.
deed of the 8th of May, 1807, proves, that James Jf. Lingan did then
convey the tract of four hundred and twenty acres of land in the
bill mentioned to John Henderson; the receipt or memorandum of
the 10th of June, 1807, which has been authenticated, proves, that
the purchase money was not then paid; and the witness Henry
Waring, in consistency with, and in corroboration of these instru-
ments of writing, proves, that John Henderson, in his lifetime,
repeatedly admitted he had purchased the land referred to in those
instruments of writing, for which he was to pay thirteen dollars
and one-third of a dollar per acre; but that he had paid no part
of the purchase money, and was unable to pay it; and this witness
further proves, that the land was held by John Henderson until his
death, when it descended to his children, who are defendants to
this suit. There is no proof of the purchase money ever having
been paid. It is admitted, that James M. Lingan is dead, and that
these plaintiffs are his legal representatives. This is the substance
of the case, according to the proofs, and in all material points, it
accords exactly with one of the alternatives of the case set forth in
the hill.
Whence it is sufficiently clear, that the plaintiffs have sustained
their^case in opposition to the general defence of David English.
And, as there is not the least evidence of any payment or satisfac-
tion ever having been made in the manner relied on in defence by
the defendant Lydia English, the plaintiffs may obtain relief against
her also as well as her husband.
The defendant Richard Henderson has put his defence entirely
upon his plea of the statute of limitations; and the plaintiffs having
established their case in all respects in opposition to the other
defences; and the other defendants having made default; the
whole controversy is thus reduced to the single question, whether
this &e a valid defence against the whole or not. It is, therefore,
proper, that it should be carefully considered.
All statutes of limitation proceed upon the policy comprised
in the maxim, interest reipublica ut sit finis litium; that some
lapse of time must be prescribed in order to give quiet to human
affairs; and as affording ground to presume, without the power of
contradiction, that the alleged cause of controversy, either never
existed at all, or that if it did once actually exist, it had been in
some way finally adjusted and satisfied.(d) This principle of
(d) 1 Stark. Ev. 83; 4 Stark. Ev. 1234; Smith v. Clay, 8 Bro. C. C. 689, note
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