LINGAN v.. HENDERSON.

for the assignment of the one was paid by Clason and Stanly. And
although the assignment was made to Clason alone, yet he must
be deemed a trustee for Stanly as to a moiety; the other judgment
stands in the name of Clason and Stanly. They are, therefore, to
be taken as joint owners of both judgments. And the bill having
been taken pro confesso against Stanly, is an admission, on his
part, of satisfaction so far as his interest is concerned. The answer
or defence of Clason cannot enure to the benefit of Stanly; 1 Cairns'
Cos. in Err. 121. I have not met with any case in the bot)ks
where a bill has been taken pro confesso against one only of seve-
ral defendants. But in order to give the force and effect to this
default, which is contemplated by the statute, the proceedings
must, thereafter, be considered in the nature of separate suits,
especially where the nature of the controversy is such as to admit
of distinct consideration, and separate relief. Where the defence
set up goes to the essence and foundation of the claim made by the
bill, and that is wholly destroyed by the party appearing, there may
be some difficulty in enforcing the decree against the party who
has suffered the bill to be taken pro confesso. But in the present
case, we may consider Clason as attempting to enforce the collec-
tion of a debt due to himself and his co-partner, when his co-part-
ner has acknowledged satisfaction as to his claim. If Stanly is to
be considered jointly interested with Closon, it was no doubt com-
petent to him to release or acknowledge satisfaction, so far as his
interest is concerned, and his default as equivalent to such acknow-
ledgment; and his rights are to be viewed in the same light as if
he had appeared and answered, and confessed the facts stated in
the bill. No injustice is done to Clason; a moiety is all he shews
himself entitled to. If the sole and exclusive right to the part-
nership debts has been transferred to him, he ought to have shewn
it. This answer, it is true, states a dissolution of the partnership
in 1803; and that by an agreement between him and Stanly all
the property, debts, and effects of the co-partnership became vested
in him solely. The dissolution of the partnership is proved, but
there is no evidence of the agreement in relation to the partner-
ship concerns."

Upon which the Chancellor's decree was, by a majority of the
court, reversed in toto; but the minority proposed to reverse it
only to the extent of Stanly's interest(m)

(m) Clason v. Morris, 10 John. Rep. 524.
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