LINGAN v. HENDERSON.

the other executor; because until the entire cause of suit has been
barred or satisfied, each executor is liable for the whole, so far as
he may have assets. And so upon a bill of reviver against several,
although but one of the defendants by his answer insisted, that he
had no title to revive: it was held, that the plaintiff must at the
hearing shew, that he had a good title to revive, or he could take
nothing by his suit.(l)

A bill was filed in the Court of Chancery of New York, by Morris
and Mowatt, as assignees of Sands, a bankrupt, against Clason
and Stanly. From which case, among a variety of other circum-
stances, it appears, that the defendants had been partners in trade,
and as such had obtained a judgment at law against Sands, and
had also obtained a right to another judgment against him by
assignment. After which Sands became a bankrupt; and some
time before the institution of this suit, the partnership between the
defendants had been dissolved. The bill prayed a discovery of
what was due to the defendants, or from Clason to Sands, &c.; that
satisfaction might be entered up on the judgments; and that an
injunction issue to restrain the defendants from proceeding by
execution, £c. The defendant Clason put in his answer relying
on a variety of facts and circumstances in his defence, &c. Stanly,
residing out of the State, the bill, as against him, was taken pro
confesso, for want of appearance, after a regular advertisement to
come in and answer. Testimony having been taken, and the case
heard, it was decreed, that the two judgments were to be deemed
fully satisfied, and to be so entered accordingly. From this decree
Clason appealed, and the Chancellor, in assigning the reasons for
his decree to the appellate court, says, speaking of the circum-
stance of Clason only having answered and made defence in the
Court of Chancery, that " There was evidence, that the copartner-
ship between Clason and Stanly was long since dissolved; and the
blll having been taken pro confesso against Stanly, which entitled
the plaintiffs to a decree against him, and the proceedings against
the defendant Clason concluding to the same point, it was useless
to trace what might have been the effect of a different state of
things."

The judge, with whose opinion a majority of the members of
the appellate court concurred, among other things, says, in relation
to the matter under consideration in this case—"The first question

*
(l) Harris v. Pollard, S P. Will. 348.