LINGAN v. HENBERS0N.

Ibeen Mly satisfied. Hence it is clear, that this contract as against
these defendants is as absolutely indivisible and incapable of being
broken up into separate parts by them, or in their favour by the
•court, as it was against John Henderson during his lifetime.

It appears, that, of these five defendants, David English and
Lydia his wife, alone have put in such an answer as the bill calls
for; that after they had done so, and the bill had been amended,
the defendant Richard Henderson filed a plea of the statute of limi-
tations, to which answer and plea the plaintiffs put in a general
replication; and that the order of publication has been published
as required, so that the bill may now be taken pro confesso against
the absent defendants Sarah Henderson and Janet L. Henderson.
In this situation the case has been brought before the court for a
final decree upon the whole matter in controversy.

The defence of Lydia English goes to the whole; because
she admits, that such a contract as is stated in the bill was actually
made, but avers, that it was satisfied; in others words she con-
fesses and avoids the whole charge; and therefore, if her matter
in avoidance be true, the plaintiffs can have no relief against her;
because she would thus shew, that the whole claim had been
actually satisfied. The defendant David English is passive; with-
out expressly denying any thing, he admits nothing; and therefore,
unless the plaintiffs establish their claim, as set forth, they can have
no relief against him to any extent whatever. The defendant
Richard Henderson rests his defence upon a plea of the statute of
limitations. This defence also goes to the whole. It admits, that
although a contract may have been made as alleged, yet it has been
barred by the lapse of the prescribed length of time; and there-
fore, if this plea be properly applicable to the case and true, the
plaintiffs can have no relief against this defendant, Richard Hen-
derson. But the defendants, Sarah Henderson and Janet L. Hen-
derson, having falled to answer, the bill may be taken pro confesso
against them, and any relief may be awarded to the plaintiffs which
can, under their general prayer, be sanctioned by the nature of
their case.

Whence this important question necessarily arises; whether the
court, in any suit against a plurality of defendants, where any one
of them makes, and sustains such a defence as goes to the whole,
can pass a decree against any other of them, who has made no
such defence, or as against whom the bill might otherwise be
taken pro confesso ?