HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.

The acknowledgment of a feme covert to a deed, as prescribed
by the act of assembly, it is obvious, was introduced as a substi-
tute for a fine; and although a deed of bargain and sale, so ac-
knowledged, will not, like a fine, as relates to the interests of third
persons, work a discontinuance,(k) yet as regards the feme covert
herself it as effectually, and to a like extent, passes her interest
as a fine.(l) Hence an acknowledgment of a feme covert, made
according to the act of assembly, like that made on levying a fine,
can operate only so far, and no farther, than the deed itself, to
which it is annexed, would operate, according to its nature, sup-
posing it to have been made by the husband before the marriage,
or by herself alone while sole.

It is, therefore, my opinion, that the acknowledgment of this
plaintiff to the lease to Bryden, can only be construed as an
improvement and further security to Brydenjs title; and that, on
the death of Samuel Chase, the plaintiff became immediately
entitled to dower in the reversion of the Fountain Inn; and also
in the rent reserved by that lease, without delay of execution
during the term.

At law, the widow can recover damages or mesne profits for the
detention of her dower only from the time it was actually demanded
of the heir. And if the jury fail to assess damages for the deten-
tion, she can recover no costs; because costs are given only where
damages are recovered.(l) But in equity it is otherwise; here it
is the course of the court to assign her dower, and universally to
give her an account of the rents and profits from the death of her
husband. But where the heir throws no difficulties in her way,
and admits her claim, she has no costs, (m) In this case, how-
ever, it appears, that every possible opposition has been made to
Ihis plaintiff's claim, (n) As to the value of the rents and profits,
one-third of the rent reserved by the lease to Bryden, and no more,
can be recovered during that term. After that time the actual

purchaser or mortgagee may lose the estate, if the seller or mortgagor fraudulently
sell or mortgage to another person whose deed is the first registered, and questions
upon the priority of registered deeds often lead to litigation.—Sugden's Letters on
Sales, &c. 47.

(k) Lawrence v. Heister, S H. & J. 377; Mayson's Lessee v. Sexton, 1 H. &
McH. 275; Nicholson's Lessee v. Hemsley, 3 H. & McH. 400.—(I) Colegate B.
Owing's case, post 000.—(I) William v. Gwyn, 2 Saund. 45, note; Pow. Mort. 718,
noteP; 2 Hapr. Ent. 698.—(m) Curtis v. Curtis, 2 Bro. C. C. 632; Dormer v.
Fortesqme, 3 Atk. ISO.—(ti) Lucas v. Calcraft, 1 Bro. C, C. 1S4; Worgan v. Ryder,
1 Ves. & Bea. 20; 2 Mad. Chan. 564.