HANNAH K, CHASE'S CASE.

The chief value of this lot of land within the city of Baltimore,
consisted in there being a large edifice erected upon it, which was
occupied and used as a tavern: the loss of which, if destroyed by
fire or otherwise, must have been borne by Chase; as-it was held
at his risk entirely, (n) There was nothing of that reciprocity so
essentially necessary to constitute a mortgage. It is as essential
that the one party should have it in his power, at some specified
time, to compel the re-payment of the money, or to foreclose, as
that the other should have it in his power to redeem. But, although
Bryden might re-purchase for a stipulated sum at any time, during
4he sixteenth year after the date of the contract, yet Chase could
not compel Bryden to pay any sum of money, at any time : Chase
took no bond, or other collateral security from Bryden; nor is there
any clause in any deed or conveyance, by which Bryden covenants
or promises to pay Chase any sum of money. If the edifices had
been destroyed, or the property had been ever so much reduced in
value, Chase could have recovered nothing of Bryden. The contract
is, therefore, utterly destitute of that mutuality always incident and
necessarily belonging to a mortgage of any description.(o) But it
appears, by the lease from Chase to Bryden, that this contract
was, notwithstanding the bond, regarded as an absolute sale with
a condition to re-purchase, and nothing more, by Bryden himself;
for, he obtained and accepted a relmquishment of the right of dower
of the wife of Chase. And it appears, from the proposals of Samuel
Chase, one of these defendants, made on the 2d of April, 1811,
that he also, then considered the contract as an absolute sale; for,
fee speaks of this plaintiff's then existing right of dower.

Upon the whole I am satisfied, that the late Samuel Chase was
seized of an estate in fee simple in this property, of which the
plaintiff, as his widow, is entitled to dower.

The next inquiry is, as to the extent of the recovery. Some of
the authorities cited in reference to this branch of the case, related
exclusively to the modern creatures of equity, called terms attendant
upon the inheritance, which were not clearly recognised and defined
in England until about the year 1670; and which have, so far as
I can learn, never been introduced into this State, and are not
likely to become fashionable among us, The equitable principles

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(n) Co. Litt., n. 1; Pow. Mort 125, note P., and 138, note T.—(o) Tasburgh
v. Echlin, Pow. Mort. 133; Thornborough v. Baker, 3 Swan. 631; Goodman v.
Grierson, 2 Bal. & Bea. 279; Robertson v. Campbell, 2 Call. 421; Roberts v. Cocke,
1 Rand. 121.