HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE. 213

To this it is objected, that a receiver cannot be appointed, because
the claim of the plaintiff does not extend to the whole, but only to
one-third of the property in controversy.

The appointment of a receiver does not involve the deter-
mination of any right; or affect the title of either party in any
manner whatever: but still an application for such an appointment
can only be made by those who have an acknowledged interest;
or where there is strong reason to believe, that the party asking for
a receiver will recover. I am of opinion, that the plaintiff has a
sufficient presumption of title, to rest this application upon.(c)
But unless she has also shown, that the rents and profits are in
imminent danger, a receiver cannot be appointed. A manifest
abuse of a trust by an habitual and prospective course of dealing,
bringing the property into danger, has been held to afford sufficient
ground for the appointment of a receiver: but in no case has there
been the least hesitation in making such an appointment, where the
party in the actual receipt of the rents and profits was shown to be
insolvent. Here the property is in the hands and under the control
of the defendant Samuel Chase: and it is shown by the exhibits
attached to the petition, that he has, pending this suit, actually
obtained the benefit of the insolvent laws. He is, therefore,
legally and in fact insolvent. Hence, it clearly appears that the
rents and profits of the property in question are exposed to immi-
nent danger, or indeed to inevitable loss.

A receiver is appointed for the benefit of the interested party
who makes the application, and for any others who may choose to
avail themselves of it, and who may have an interest in the pro-
perty proposed to be put into the hands of a receiver. The
immediate moving cause of the appointment is the preservation of
the subject of litigation, or the rents and profits of it, from waste,
loss or destruction; so that there may be some harvest, some fruits
to gather after the labours of the controversy are over. The ulte-
rior objects of the appointment are those contemplated by the suit
itself; they are the several kinds of relief, which may be asked
for and obtained by the complainant's bill. Where the plaintiff
claims the whole, as a purchaser or by a superior tide, if he suc-
ceeds, it eventuates that the appointment was entirely and exclu-
sively for his benefit, (d)

(c) Stitwell v. Williams, 6 Mad. 49; Clark v. Dew, 1 Rus. & Myl. 103; Davis v.
Marlborough, 2 Swan. 146.—(d) Lloyd v. Passingbam, 16 Ves. 59; Davis v. Marl-
borough, 2 Swan. 125.