JONES v. MAGILL.

in of the answer of the defendant John F. Gittings, and until
further order.

The defendant Magill, by his petition, referring to the previous
proceedings, stated, that the defendant Gittings, for a long time
previous to the filing of the bill, and then did reside out of the
limits of this State; which, as he believes, was known to the
plaintiff when she instituted this suit; and yet, she had not stated
the fact in her bill and prayed for an order of publication, in place
of a subpaena against him; whereupon the petitioner prayed, that
the plaintiff might be compelled to proceed against the defendant
Gittings without delay, &c.

than the present defendants have, to expect success on a motion to dissolve, made on
filing the answer, without any submission on the part of the complainant for a final
decision. Had the complainant made such a submission, it would have amounted
to a total abandonment of his application for relief, because in case of such submis-
sion, as has already been said, every part of the answer would be considered as
admitted; and no part of the bill, except what is admitted by answer, would be of
any avail. Of course the decree would be for immediate dissolution and dismission
of the bill.

The injunction was granted on two grounds. The bill alleged, 1st, an agreement
in writing of the deceased to take only three per cent, interest, instead of sir, for
which judgment is entered : 2d, the payment of a sum for which no credit is given.
The answer does not expressly deny the agreement; although the defendants say
they do not believe that it ever existed. As to the payment, which is the most sub-
stantial ground, the answer says not a syllable. How then is it possible, on the
present motion, to expect an order for dissolution.

The Chancellor has taken the trouble of giving a full explanation; because it is his
custom, aim, and wish, to have the principles and practice of this court understood,
and particularly where some of the parties are not residents of this State.

As the counsel complains of delay, and mentions the anxiety of his clients to
obtain an early termination of this cause, the Chancellor must aver, that little delay
has proceeded from this court. He will go further, as he conceives he may do with
propriety, and suggest what is proper to be done for expediting the cause. The
defendants may obtain a rule for further proceedings, &c. This will either oblige
the complainant soon to take out a commission, or will soon put him out of court.
And if a commission be taken out, a little diligence and vigilance on the part of the
defendants will obtain an early return of the commission; or put it in their power
to shew, that delay is sought by the complainant.

Now in cases of injunction, obtained on filing the bill, the Chancellor has always
thought it his duty to discourage, as much as he could, consistently with a fair
administration of justice, all studied or needless delay on the part of the com-
plainant.

It is ordered, that the injunction in this cause heretofore issued, shall continue
until final hearing or further order.

Alter which, on the 17th of December, 1803, by direction of the plaintiff, the
injunction was dissolved, and the bill dismissed with costs