192 JONES v. MAGILL.

trustee and cestui que trust were both made defendants, and the
trustee would not answer, a motion to dissolve was permitted to be

which he admits the sale as stated; but denies, in general terms, the alleged defects
in the title; and then sets forth various particulars, not responsive to the bill, going
to shew, as he avers, that the vendors had a good and valid title; that he alone, from
the peculiar nature of the case, was interested in having the injunction speedily
dissolved, &c. Upon the filing of his answer, and before the other defendants had
answered, he entered upon the docket and gave notice of a motion to dissolve the
injunction.

On the 20th of February, 1810, the other defendants put in their answers separately,
in which they admit, that the sale was made as stated by the plaintiffs; but deny that
there was any misrepresentation, or defect of title. After which, the motion to dis-
solve the injunction was brought on to be heard, on the notice which had been given
immediately after filing the answer of the defendant McMechen.

1th March, 1810.—KILTY, Chancellor.—Before the expiration of the time limited
by the order, passed on the first or second day of the term for the dissolution of the
injunction nisi, the counsel for the complainants shewed cause to the contrary, which
was noted on the docket. It was objected, on their part, that the notice of motion
to dissolve was entered on the answer of the defendant McMechen only; and, that
the answers of the other defendants were afterwards put in without a repetition of
the notice. The Chancellor considers, that, according to the rules and practice of
the court, the defendants are not entitled to a hearing of their motion at this term*
It is thereupon continued till the next term, to be then heard; but it will be in the
power of the defendants, if they think proper, to give notice also of the motion to
be then made.

The defendants then gave notice of a motion to dissolve the injunction at the next
term, when it was regularly brought before the court.

9th July, 1810.—KILTT, Chancellor.—The motion for dissolving the injunction in
this case, came on to be argued according to the notice given, since which the bill,
answer, and exhibits, have been considered.

The ground of the complainants1 bill was, that a good title could not be made to
the land purchased by the testator, William Evans, from Barry and Stewart, the
assignees of Yates. It is alleged therein, that at the time of the said sale, and before,
it was publicly stated by Yates, the acting auctioneer, that the title was unquestion-
able. This fact is not expressly denied, either by the answer of Yates, who is made
a defendant, or of McMechen, who is principally interested in the suit; although they
allege, that the right of the assignee, and of the mortgagee, was all that was sold.
But the equity of the complainants does not rest on that fact alone; as the question
of the title is proper to be considered without any such express statement or assu-
rance respecting it. Although it was contended in the argument, that the right only
being sold, the purchaser was bound to take it at his risk. This position cannot be
admitted, except in cases where the title was expressly stated, or known to be
doubtful, and a reduced price was given accordingly.

It does not appear, from the severate answers, that there is such a clear tide to the
land as those who claim under the purchaser ought to have before the money is paid.
The legal title set up being only as to a part, and the equitable one being somewhat
uncertain. The defendant McMechen states, that he believes Yates had a good and
valid title to the land called Springfield, and that he bought the greater part from the
Baltimore Company, the deeds for which are regularly acknowledged and recorded;
and the equitable title to a part derived from James McFadon is also set forth. The
defendant Yates refers, likewise, to the Baltimore records. But it cannot be expected,