JONES v. MAGILL. 187

the statement in the bill, that the facts rest altogether within the
knowledge of one or two of them, the Chancellor always, in
granting the injunction, specifies the time and terms upon which
a motion for a dissolution may be heard. It is declared, that
the motion may be heard without answer, or immediately at
the same term, or during the sittings of the next term after
the filing of the answer, without notice; or at any time, on
giving so many days notice, after filing the answer; or on the
answer of one or more of the defendants before the others have

The question arising in this case is an important one as it respects the interests of
the parties, and the power and jurisdiction of this court. The position laid down by
the late Chancellor, and which appears to be conformable to the principles of a court
of equity, was, that this court ought not to control the judgment of commissioners,
in cases similar to the present; who, when they exercise their judgment on a subject,
over which the law has invested them with power; and determine on an act to
which that power is competent, cannot with propriety be restrained.

The question occurs then, whether, in this case, the law has invested the commis-
sioners with a power on the subject over which they have exercised their judgment ?
The act empowers them to survey, lay out, and open a road in the best and straightest
direction; and leaves the manner of executing it to their discretion, without requiring
a confirmation of their proceedings by the Levy Court, or any other tribunal. It was
for the legislature to determine, whether such power should be given, and they have
made no exception; but that of the buildings, yards, orchards, or meadows, through
which they are prohibited from running, without the owner's consent. But it is
alleged, that the commissioners, acting under a special authority, have exceeded the
powers vested in them, by locating the road over the mill race, which is as much a
building, or part of a building, as the mill house. If the Chancellor could entertain
this opinion, the injunction would certainly be made perpetual; but a mill race is,
in no sense, a building, or a part of a building. (Co. Litt. 161, a.)

One of the grounds for the injunction, stated in the bill, is, that a road equally
good with that contemplated by the commissioners, and as little expensive, may be
had by running it through the complainant's land above the race and dam. But
this opinion is expressly contradicted by the commissioners. Surely this is a point
on which the law has invested them with a power to decide according to their
judgment; and the propriety of that judgment ought not to be questioned by this
court. So that this averment, by the complainant, cannot have any weight; nor is
it necessary to consider the depositions respecting it, even if, from the contrariety of
that sort of testimony, furnished by the respective parties, any satisfactory opinion
could be formed.

The observations of the complainant, respecting the valuation made by the com-
missioners, are answered by referring to the provision made by the act for an inqui-
sition by a jury to which he might have resorted.

Before a great public work should be impeded, by the continuance of an injunction,
it ought to appear clearly and satisfactorily, that the defendants were about to act
contrary to the law which gave them the power, or to do acts not sanctioned by it;
or in some other way to injure the complainant, so as to come within the established
principles, as a ground for their being restrained by this court

Such a case has not been made out by this complainant, and it is therefore ordered
that the injunction be dissolved.