THOMPSON. 16§

subject referred to them with the attention which the large pecu-
niary amount, and the importance of the principles involved in its
considerations demand. The petitioner has been proceeded against
in chancery by; the counter petitioners and others, as a trustee,
holding funds which, by the principles of equity, as il is said, he
is bound to distribute to sundry creditors of a certain Marcus Hey-
land. The defendant denies the trust alleged, and claims the
amount in his hands as due to himself. The Chancellor, by an
interlocutory order, has decided, that certain papers filed as exhi-
bits in the cause, prove the trust to exist as alleged, and has
directed the fund, amounting to about $70,000, to be brought into
court. The petitioner alleges, that the interlocutory order is wholly
a manifest violation of the principles of chancery law, in order-
ing money to be deposited into court by a defendant, claiming title
to it, and more especially in adopting such an order as a means of
coercion, by which to compel a defendant to a final decision of his
cause, without the proof which his counsel may think proper and
necessary; but is also injurious to him in the highest degree,
without any corresponding benefit to the adverse party, whose
interest, it is said, will be promoted by allowing the defendant to
give such security as will ensure the prompt payment of the
money, with the accumulating interest, at the termination of the
cause. With regard to the correctness of the decree or order, the
committee intentionally avoid any expression of opinion. The
high authority of the Chancellor, and the opinions of the able and
distinguished counsel who conduct the cause of the petitioner, are
opposed, and the committee gladly avail themselves of the absence
of any necessity to pass between them.

"In whatever other respects a difference of opinion is found to
exist, it is admitted on all hands, that from an interlocutory order
to bring money into court, there is no appeal by the existing laws.
Indeed, the nonexistence of such a right, is the sole ground of the
application now before the Senate. The question we are called on
to determine, is, whether it be advisable to interpose a special
legislation to correct an alleged error of the Chancellor. It will.
at once occur, that the affirmative of this question necessarily
involves the previous investigation of the case, and the decision
that the Chancellor has erred. It would seem to be obvious, that
if a defendant is not injured by a judicial decision, he can with
no propriety claim from the legislature a Special enactment for

his relief.

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