158 McKIM v. THOMPSON.

Ms own answer, covered himself with shame; yet the order went
no further than the incontrovertible facts would fairly warrant; or,
as the Chancellor says, " under all circumstances." Hence, if the
statements, allegations, and then situation of the case, in relation
to the motion, are of such a nature as to leave the matter open to
be affected by the proofs to be adduced at the final hearing, the
court cannot pass any interlocutory order or decree whatever on
the subject.(g)

But in the case of Freeman and Fairlie, the facts appear to have
been deduced, under all circumstances, from the answer itself. The
first step taken to find facts beyond, but in the immediate precincts
of the answer, was, where a schedule was referred to in the answer
as containing a correct statement; the items of which schedule,
if added up, would shew the sum admitted to be due. Such a
form of admission was, therefore, held to establish the facts as
unequivocally as if the sum had been distinctly specified in the
answer itself. This position necessarily comprehended another
case, going apparently one step further, but which was, in fact,
precisely the same in principle; that is, where the party referred
in his answer to, and produced a set of books of account, and
alleged, that they contained a true statement of facts. If, on
referring them to the auditor, he reports, that they shew a certain
amount to be in the defendant's hands, it will be considered as an
indirect, but sufficient admission of such fact; and the court will
order the money to be brought in.(h) But, if no distinct fact can
be deduced from the answer itself, laying a foundation for such a
motion, and the case is referred to the auditor, and the party, on
his examination there, makes admissions of such facts, they will
be considered as binding and conclusive as if made in the answer
itself. So much, then, for the direct and indirect statements and
admissions of the party himself, (i)

There are other cases, which shew that the court has gone
much further with the principle, and distinctly manifested a dispo-
sition to follow it out in all its bearings. For, where a controverted
case of accounts had been referred to the auditor to adjust, and the
parties had there folly contested the matter, and the report of the

(f) Strange v. Harris, 3 Bro. C, C. 865; Peaeham v. Daw, 6 Mad. 98.—(h) Mills
v.. Hanson, 8 Yes. 68, 91; Hatch v. ——, 19 Ves. 116; Wood v. Downes, 1 Yes. &
Bea, 49; Roe v. Gudgeon, Coop. Rep. 804.—(t) Quarrell v. Beckford, 14 Ves 177;
Vigrass v. Binfield, 8 Mad. 62.