McKIM v. THOMPSON. 155

produce such paper or papers, book or books: and that the motion
be heard during the next term.

Under this order, proofs were collected and returned. The
hearing of this matter was, by consent, or from other causes, from
time to time postponed. The defendant, Thompson, having pre-
pared and sworn to a supplemental answer on the 21st February,
1823, moved for leave to introduce it at once into the case, without
shewing why the matter, therein stated, had not been set forth in
his original answer; but he was not allowed thus to file it. After-
wards, on the 31st of January, 1825, the defendant, Thompson,
filed a petition, on oath, in which he stated, that he had, through
inadvertence in one instance, and for want of a knowledge of some
facts, in other respects, as to which he had since obtained full
information, misstated several circumstances in his answer, all of
which he prayed leave to correct by a supplemental answer. No
order was passed on this application; but, soon after it was filed,
the parties were heard on the order of the 14th of December, 1822.

12th February, 1825.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The arguments of
counsel, on this petition, to obtain an order commanding Hugh
Thompson to bring a certain sum of money into court, have been
heard and duly weighed, and the proceedings in the cause have
been attentively read and considered.

This practice of ordering money to be brought into court, is one
of very late origin. Lord Eldon is reported to have said in 1803,
" I remember when the practice was introduced of making a
defendant pay in money, appearing, by his answer or examination,
to be in his hands."(a) But it seems to have been attended with
so many beneficial consequences, to have been so often resorted to,
and so many of the cases have been reported, that the principles
of the rule by which the court is now governed may be considered
as fairly and folly developed. In the investigation of the principles
applicable to this petition or motion, as indeed in relation to every
other legal inquiry, we should particularly bear in mind, that it is
the reason and spirit of cases make the law; not the letter of
particular precedents.(o)

It is held to be a fundamental axiom, that the judgment of a
court must be the conclusion of law arising from the facts presented

(«) Mills v. Hanson, S Ves. 91; Gilb. For. Rom. 179.—(6) Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr.
1364; Doe dem. Lancashire v. Lancashire. 5 T. R. 62.