RINGGOLD'S CASE. 15

no new matter, not in issue in the court below, can be insisted on
in the court above;(g) and that no account which was not asked
for at the hearing below, can be made the ground of appeal. (h)

Whence it appears, although in equity as well as at common
law, the parties, after framing their allegations to suit the peculiar
nature of their case, are allowed sufficient time and means to bring
in all their proofs; and are then permitted to take any exceptions,
and to make any points they may think proper, that yet they are not
suffered, by an appeal, to cast their case into a new shape; or to
give it a new, or different aspect in any respect whatever; since the
sole object of an appeal, in all cases, whether at law, or in equity, is
not to allow the appellant to present a different, or a better case; but
merely to enable the appellate court to correct such errors as it may
appear the inferior court had fallen into, upon a review of the identical
case upon which the court below had decided, and nothing more.

No statutory provisions have been made in England for the
purpose of regulating the right of appeal from the Court of Chancery,
or for preventing its abuse; and therefore the matter has been
hitherto entirely governed by such rules as have been laid down by
the original and appellate tribunals themselves, upon due considera-
tion of the peculiar nature of the subject, (i) It is admitted, that
very grave reasons should be required to induce the couA to refuse
the benefit of appeal ;(j) and that any interference with the right
of appeal is a delicate subject, to be applied with jealousy(k)
Nevertheless, as it would be atlended with consequences most
oppressive, to suitors in equity, if an appeal were allowed, of itself,
to operate as a stay of proceedings, it has long been tbt established
practice of the Court of Chancery to consider an appeal as, in no
case, having the effect of suspending its proceedings, unless an
order for that purpose is made by the court itself; or unless, in
special cases, the appellate court should interpose by a special
order. (!) And, even if the decree were absolute and final, yet, if
I it were of such a nature, that the consequence of suspending its
execution would, in effect, be, if the party in whose favour it had
been made should die before the appeal could be heard, a reversal
of the decree without any judgment of the court, the proceedings
would not be stayed.(m) The Court of Chancery appears to have

(f) Thompson v Waller, Pre. Chan 295.—(h) Chamley v. Dunsany, i Scho. &
Lefr 712-(i) 2 Exch. Pra. 202.—(j) Wood v. Griffith, 10 Ves. 551.—(k) Way
v. Foy, 18 Ves. 454-(l) Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves. 213.-(m) Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves.
214; Wood v. Milner, 1 Jac. & Wal. 616.