BURCH v. SCOTT.

due; or owing to a kind of negligence for which they we not at
all blamable, or for which they may, at least, be excused. Upon
these grounds they pray to have the decree opened and the cause
re-heard. According to the English authorities, if the enrolment
of a decree be obtained by surprise, or irregularly, it may be
opened; provided, the application be made within a reasonable
time. And where the merits of the case had not been entered
into, an enrolled decree has been set aside upon special circum-
stances, notwithstanding the proceedings were strictly regular.
For a court of equity will make every effort, within its power, to
reach the merits of the case, and have justice done.(j)

This bill, then, divested of all extraneous matter, may be regarded
in three distinct characters: first, as an original bill, to have the
decree of the 4th of August last reversed on the ground of fraud,
because it injuriously affects the interests of some of these com-
plainants who were not parties to it; secondly, as a bill of review
for error apparent on the face of the decree; and thirdly, as a bill,
grounded on the peculiar circumstances, asking to have the decree
by default set aside, and the case re-heard upon the merits.

It was in these characters, that it presented itself to the mind
of the Chancellor, when it was first laid before him. He then felt,
as he still does, a strong impression, that these different characters
and alternative aspects, and prayers, were so entirely incompatible,
as to be incapable of being blended together in the same bill :(k)
but he conceived, that if it could be sustained in all, or any of
them, the parties complaining would be entitled to relief. And,
under this impression, it seemed to him fit and proper, to suspend,
at least for a season, the execution of the decree, until these mat-
ters could be more carefully canvassed, and both parties could be
heard. And therefore it was, that he passed the order of the 16th
of November last; which operated as an injunction, and was
intended so to operate. (1)

(j) Kemp v. Squire, 1 Ves. 206; 2 Mad. Chan. 465.

(k) Perry v. Phillips, 17 Ves. 176.

(I) Restrictive orders, staying the execution of the court's own decree, so common
in England, have always there, Edin. Inj. 209, as here, been considered as injunc-
tions, and been treated accordingly, Norwood v, Norwood, MS. 1808.

CLAPHAM v. THOMPSON.—This was a bill to account, &c., filed on the 22d of
September, 1787, praying for relief, and also for an injunction to stay m sale under a
fieri facias from this court. Upon which was passed the following order.

22d September, 1787.—ROGERS, Chancellor.—On the bill of complaint exhibited in
this court by Josias dapham and Mary Carey, against Cornelius Thompson, John