HOFFMAN v. JOHNSON. 105

whole from the one sued; that is, to have it placed in his power,
as far as practicable, to obtain reimbursement, by being clothed
with all the powers of the creditor and substituted in his place.(a)
These principles and privileges, it is said, have been substantially
adopted by all the nations of Europe, of whose code the Roman
law forms the basis; which shows that they accord very much
with natural equity and the common sense of mankind, (i) The
principles of equity, of England and of Maryland, although in most
respects substantially the same, are apparently not so broad and
indiscriminate in their application.

In the ordinary case of a money bond, there is no distinction,
upon the face of it, between the principal and the surety; who
being both debtors to the same creditor; a court of equity will
rarely, if in any case, be induced to make any distinction between
them, as regards their creditor. Being alike his debtors, and
equally bound to him; and the credit having been given to them
all together; equity never interferes with such a contract, so as to
loosen any of its ligatures, unless upon peculiar and strong ground.
Yet, as between themselves, such obligors, without prejudice to
their creditor, may be treated, according to the fact, as principal
and surety, and relieved accordingly. The surety may come into
equity to compel his principal to relieve him of his liability by pay-
ing off the debt; but it is otherwise in the case of a bond of
indemnity, the legal effect of which is to protect against the conse-
quences of future deficiencies, but not to entitle the party to call
for anticipated and precautionary payment, by way of preventing
the risk of his being thereafter damnified, (c) Hence it is evident,
that a case can rarely occur, under a contract in the form of a
mere money bond, where one of the obligors, who may be, in feet,
no more than a surety, can be considered as discharged by reason
of the obligee's not proceeding against his co-obligor; or, merely
because of the laches of the creditor, (d)

The principles of law in relation to negotiable and commercial
paper, have arisen out of the peculiar nature and uses of such in-
struments. It has been found, from experience, every where, that
it is of the utmost importance, in commercial affairs, that the
holder of such paper should, without delay, give every one who
has become a surety or endorser, notice of its fate Hence the

(a) Coop. Just. Inst. 612.—(b) Hayes v. Ward, 4 John. C. C, 18S.—(c) Antro-
bus v. Davidson, 3 Meriv. 578,—(d) Ex pearte Roshforfli, 10 Ves. 414; Coop. Just
Inst. 462, 612.

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