| Volume 200, Volume 4, Page 143 View pdf image (33K) |
|
DUGAN VS. HOLLINS. 143 143, and the cases there referred to. And in that case, it was adjudged, that a legacy of $500 to each of the testator's two grandsons, to be paid by his executor, was not evidence of an intention to charge the real estate in the hands of the devisee with the payment of the legacies, the court in their opinion say- ing, that the legatees and devisee appear to have been alike the objects of the bounty of the testator, and it not appearing to have been his intention to encumber his lands with the payment of the legacies, and there being no evidence that the executor, who was the devisee of the real estate, had wasted or misapplied the personalty, the legatees were adjudged to have no claim upon the proceeds of the real estate, and, consequently, the personalty being insufficient, they were disappointed. The case now before this court, it is thought, is not distin- guishable in principle from the ease referred to. It is the case of a pecuniary legacy not chargeable upon the real estate, and in which the personalty being insufficient, the legatee must bear the loss, having no right to resort to the real estate in the hands of the devisee, who, with himself, is equally the object of the bounty of the testator. The general rule of marshalling assets, as explained and ap- plied by the Court of Appeals, in the case of Chase vs. 'Locker- man, 11 G.& J., 185, furnishes no authority for throwing these legacies upon the real estate devised, or for compelling the devisees to contribute. Other cases were referred to in the argument, but as they simply reaffirm the rule established in Stevens vs. Gregg, and Chase vs. Lockerman, it is not thought necessary to cite them. These views dispose of the first and second claim made by the complainant, and show that, in my opinion, he cannot have recourse to the real estate devised to the testator's two daugh- ters and their children, for the payment of the sums of money bequeathed to him and his brother Hammond Dugan in the 14th clause of the will. These legacies were payable out of the per- sonal estate of the testator, and out of that alone. The complainant's third claim, as enumerated in his state- ment filed on the 18th instant, is founded upon the 15th clause |
||||
|
| ||||
|
| ||||
| Volume 200, Volume 4, Page 143 View pdf image (33K) |
|
Tell Us What You Think About the Maryland State Archives Website!
|
An Archives of Maryland electronic publication.
For information contact
mdlegal@mdarchives.state.md.us.