| Volume 200, Volume 2, Page 319 View pdf image (33K) |
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BROWN VS. BROWN. 319 ssmbly of December session, 1841, ch., 262, since which time, two supplements have been passed; the first in 18A3, ch. 287, the last in 1844, ch. 306. By the second section of the original act, the causes for which divorces a vinculo matrimonii, may be granted, are stated. These are five i& number, and the fourth, which is supposed to embrace this case, authorises the court to decree a divorce of this absolute character "when the party complained against has abandoned the party complaining, and has remained absent from the state for five years." By the third section of the same act, a divorce a mensa et thoro may be granted for abandon- ment and desertion, without regard to its duration, or the ab- sence of the party from the state. The act of 1844, ch. 306, repeals those portions' of the second section of the original act, which requires absence from the state for five years, on the part of the party complained against, as a cause of divorce a vinculo matrimonii, with a proviso that no such decree shall be passed on account of abandonment, unless the court shall be satisfied, by competent proof, that such aban- donment has- continued uninterruptedly for at least three years, and is deliberate and final, and the separation of the parties beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. This latter law, it is supposed by the complainant's solicitor, not only changes so much of the act of 1841, ch. 262, as makes it necessary that the party complained agitiusit, should have re- mained absent from the state for five years, but renders absence from the state, for a period, unnecessary. It is not clear, how- ever, that this is the true construction of the act of 1844. Its language is, "that all such parts of the second section of the act to which it is a supplement, as requires absence from the state for five years, &c. be and the same are hereby repealed." It does not say that absence from the state for any period, shall not be necessary to entitle a party to an absolute divorce, but that absence for five years, shall not berequired. If the legis- lature had designed to dispense with the absence from, the state altogether, as oae of the ingredients constituting the ground for an absolute divorce, it is presumed they would have expressed |
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| Volume 200, Volume 2, Page 319 View pdf image (33K) |
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