66 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

JOHN F. WILSOJV )

vs. > SEPTEMBER TERM, 1847.
MATTHEW HARDESTY. )

[CSURT——CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF 1845, CH. 352.]

WHERE u, party goes into a court of equity to ask relief against an usurious mort-
gage or contract, he must do equity, by paying, or offering to pay, the prin-
cipal sum, with legal interest.

When the legislature transcends its authority, the courts of justice in the dis-
charge of their duties, are bound to pronounce its acts void: but this high
power of the judiciary should be exercised with great caution, andonlywhen
the act of the legislature is manifestly beyond the pale of its authority.

Retrospective laws and laws divesting vested rights, unless ex post facto, or im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, do not fall within the provision of the
constitution of the United States, however repugnant they may be to the prin-
ciples of sound legislation.

The act of 1845, ch. 352, as anecting pre-existing contracts, tainted with usury,
is neither prohibited by the constitution or bill of rights of this State; nor
does it come within the provision contained in the constitution of the United
States, prohibiting the States from passing ex post facto laws, and laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts.

[The object of the bill in this case was the sale of certain
premises which had been mortgaged to the complainant by the
defendant, to secure to the former the payment of $500 00, with
interest from the 15th October, 1840. The defendant pleaded
usury, stating that the sum actually advanced to him on the day
of the execution of the mortgage was only $470 00, and prayed
"judgment, if be, the defendant, ought to be charged with the
debt,"&c. The complainant confessed the facts of the plea,
and consented to a decree for the sum actually due. The Chan-
cellor deemed this a waiver of objection to the sufficiency of the
plea, under the act of 1845, chapter 352, which limits the de-
fence to the excessive usury, and makes it the duty of the court,
after ascertaining the amount fairly due for principal and inter-
est, to decree accordingly. Having stated the case, he deliv-
ered his opinion as follows:]