56 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

I am of the opinion that the statute of limitations, relied upon
by this defendant, interposes a flat bar to the plaintiff's right to
recover against him. The transaction out of which the claim
arises, took place in the year 1840, and the proof shows, I
think, very clearly, that the complainants, or some of them,
had notice thereof soon thereafter, and yet the bill was not filed
until January, 1846.

Now, if this defendant, John C. White, could, in any view
of the case, be looked upon as a trustee to make sale of this
stock, and that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust did at
one time exist between him and these complainants, upon which
hypothesis alone, as it seems to me, the jurisdiction of this
court could be maintained; still, this relation terminated as
soon as the stock was sold, and the obligation to pay over the
proceeds supervened. From that time it ceased to be a con-
tinuing subsisting trust, and then, whether the remedy was at
law or in equity, the right of action accrued, and limitations
began to run. Green vs. Johnson and wife, 3 G. & J., 389.

If, to be sure, the relation between these parties constituted
a purely technical trust, of which a court of chancery had ex-
clusive jurisdiction, limitations could not be successfully relied
upon, because, in that case, there being no legal remedy, the
statute could not be applied by analogy, and being in terms
not applicable to courts of equity, could not be taken advantage
of. But undoubtedly, as it appears to rne, whatever may have
been the character of the relation between them at one time, it
terminated when the stock was sold, and the obligation to pay
over the proceeds came into existence. Jingell on Lim., 349;

Kane vs. Bloodgood, 1 Johns. Chan. Rep., 90.

Indeed, the complainants themselves allege and show a ter-
mination of the trust, when they charge, as they do in their bill,
the defendant's indebtedness to them in a large sum of money,
being, as they aver, the proceeds of the stock, and the payment
of which by the defendant to them they also aver had been duly
demanded.

The Chancellor does not think that the circumstance of this
defendant being a non-resident, deprives him of the benefit of the