510 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

abled the debtor from making any voluntary settlement of his
estate to stand in the way of his existing debts."

This principle so affirmed by Chancellor Kent in Reade vs.
Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep., 500, 501, as the clear and uni-
form doctrine taught by the cases, is considered by Mr. Justice
Story as strictissimi juris, and pushing the rule to an unreason-
able extent, unless indeed the conveyance is intentionally made
to defraud creditors, when it would be void on account of ill
faith. But if the conveyance is founded upon a good consider-
ation, and is, moreover, 6ona fide; then, though the grantor
may be indebted at the time, yet if the circumstances attending
the transaction are such as to repel the presumption of fraud, it
seems, from the reasoning and cases cited by the writer, that
the mere circumstance of the party not being entirely exempt
from -debt at the time would not be sufficient to overthrow the
conveyance.

The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United
States, is, that a voluntary conveyance made by a person not
indebted at the time, in favor of his wife and children, cannot
be impeached by subsequent creditors upon the mere ground of
its being voluntary. It must be shown to have been fraudu-
lent, or made with a view to future debts; and the mere fact
of being indebted at the time does not, per se, constitute a sub-
stantive ground to avoid a voluntary conveyance for fraud, even
in regard to prior creditors. The question whether fraudulent
or not, is to be ascertained from al] the circumstances of the
case, and not alone from the mere fact of indebtment at the
time. ^'If," say the Supreme Court in Hinde's Lessee vs.
Longworth, 11 Wheat., 1991, "it could jibe shown that the
grantor was in prosperous circumstances, and unembarrassed,
and that the gift to the child was a reasonable provision, accord-
ing to his state and condition in life, and leaving enough for
the payment of the debts'of the grantor, the mere fact of his
being indebted would not make the deed fraudulent." The
want of a valuable consideration may be a badge of fraud, but
it is only presumptive, and not conclusive, evidence of it, and
may be rebutted by evidence on the other side." And this