50 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

unlike all other contracts, one of the contracting parties is per-
mitted to sit in judgment upon the contract, and pronounce
upon its validity or invalidity. Glenn vs. Clapp, 11 G. & J.,
8; 2 Bland,638,639.

The principle, however, is understood to be incontestible,
and as has been conceded in the argument, Chancellor Hanson
has laid down the rule, which should govern the court in de
ciding upon sales made under its authority. In the case of
Lawson vs. the State, in 1804, he observed, that reasons which
would induce him as proprietor or trustee, to set aside a sale
made by his agent, should determine him as Chancellor, to re-
fuse his approbation to a sale made by a trustee.

It was decided by the late Chancellor, that if a trustee di-
rected to sell-at public sale, does, notwithstanding, sell at pri-
vate sale, the sale will be confirmed, if satisfactory reasons are
given for doing so, and no objection is made. Andrews vs.
Scotton, 2 Bland, 643.

The council by whom this case has been argued, have
differed as to what was meant by the Chancellor, when he
speaks of no objection being made; but my impression is, that
he must have meant, objections of sufficient force to outweigh
the reasons given by the trustee for deviating from the terms of
the decree. And that he could not have intended that reasons
which would be satisfactory to him in the absence of objec-
tions, should be overborne by the mere unsupported veto of
any one.

Looking to the court as the vendor, and the trustee as its
agent, according to terms prescribed by the former, if for rea-
sons deemed sufficient by the court, the agent departs from the
form in which he is to exercise his authority, who could have a
right, merely upon the ground of such departure, to say that
the principal should not ratify the act of its agent ?

If the principle be sound, that the court is the vendor, and
to be considered the proprietor of the thing to be sold, such a
right of abitrary interdiction on the part of any one cannot be
maintained.

But it is to be recollected in this case, that the trustee did