486 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

The argument resulting from the convenience of the thing,
and the more perfect familiarity which the county courts, in
the exercise of their equity jurisdiction, would have of proceed-
ings had in the same courts, as courts of common law, would
apply as well in the one case, as the other; and the effect
would be, that this court would be stripped of its power, in
every case, of arresting, upon equitable grounds, the proceed-
ings of the courts of law. This view of the subject would
seem to render the objection untenable; and I therefore dis-
miss it, and proceed very briefly to examine the case upon its
merits, as disclosed by the bill and answer.

[After reviewing the facts of the case, the Chancellor pro-
ceeded.]

An injunction was ordered upon this bill, not because I
adopted, or in any way assented to this view of the relative
rights of these parties, [that the widow could only use each
parcel by itself,] but upon the allegation, that the widow,
abusing her right to take from her dower land, wood for
fuel, fences, and other necessary purposes, was acting with
a view to benefit her own children, at the expense of her step-
children.

If, according to the allegation of the bill, there was upon
each parcel of the dower land, a sufficient supply of wood and
timber for its support; and the dowress, for the purpose of
sparing that which stood upon the land in which her own
children held the fee, was unnecessarily cutting down and
using the wood and timber which stood upon the land, the in-
heritance of which was in her step-children, I thought, and still
think, it was the duty of this court, to interpose by way of in-
]unctian. Though a dowress, like all other tenants for life, has
a right to take, what is called reasonable estovers; that is,
wood from off the land for fuel, fences, &c., she cannot be per-
mitted to abuse this right, and especially, the court would not
stand by and see her abuse it, upon such motives as are im-
puted to her by this bill.