464 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

oral liens upon all the land of the defendants, continuing for
twelve years, and fastening as well upon those lands which the
defendant held at the time of the rendition of the judgment, as
those subsequently acquired. Murphy vs. McCord, 12 G. & J.,
182; Coombs vs. Jordan, .3 Bland, 284; Stow vs. Tift, 15,
Johns- Rep., 458,464.

In the case of the Cape Sable Company, the lien was con-
sidered as being dependent upon, and limited by, the right of
the creditor to sue out execution upon his judgment, and con-
sequently did not exist during the suspension of the right to
execute, from lapse of time, or other cause; and yet, judg-
ments were pronounced to be liens from their date, upon all the
lands of the defendant, wherever situated, though with respect
to lands lying in a different county, and execution could not be
taken out until a previous fieri facias had been issued, and re-
turned nulla bona to the County Court in which the judgment
was rendered. If, upon the reasoning of the Chancellor, the
lien was only commensurate with the right to take out execution
then, in the case of lands lying in a different county from that
in which the judgment was rendered, the lien should have been
postponed, until the preliminary proceedings necessary to. give
the right to send an execution out of the county had been ta-
ken; and yet the Chancellor says, "all lands, wherever they
may be, within any one of the counties of the state, are bound
by the lien, which fastens upon them from the date of the judg-
ment rendered in the County Court."

This doctrine of the Chancellor in the Cape Sable case has,
it is admitted, so far as it asserts that the lien of a judgment is
restricted by the right to take out execution upon it, been re-
versed by the Court of Appeals, and, therefore, it does not fol-
low, that, because the immediate right to send a fieri facias out
of the county in which the judgment was obtained does not
exist, the lien is suspended, and the object in referring to the
reasoning is simply to show that there is an apparent inconsist-
ency in saying that the lien is limited by the right to execute,
and yet the lien attaches before the right which gives it has
come into being.